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and bV Income Croup 117The literature on Philippine money and credit reflects very
much the historical development of the financial market and the evolution
of credit and related policies. It also reflects, the growing expertis e
in the field with a slowly increasing numbem of economists returning home
from their graduate studies. Early works dealt with the very basic
question of what type of monetaz_y system suits the Phil_ppines and what
type of central bank to establish. These studies_were made by invited
economic missions from the United States and by Filipino central and
othem bankers. Among them was Miguel Cuaderno, the first gover_or of the
Philippine Central Bank (CB). He worked closely wi'_h these missions
either as chair_nan or as head of the Philippine panel. The missions'
_eports and Cuader_o's own writings showed similar perception of the
problems of development finance, i.e._ the need to balance coordination
and independence, and to exe_else restraint in monetary expansion as a
source of finance fom development.
As the system grew in size and in variety of institutions and
assets, it also became more challenging to study. The financial market
has achieved substantial growth as shown by the[ physical presence of
larger, and greater number and more varied financial institutions.
Twelve (12) co_ercial banks composed the system in 19_6. TO date almost
a thousand financial offices are scattered all over the country. It also
happened that more Filipino economic students were available to write on
contemporary issues. Mission-type studies dominating the literature upto the early 60s have been substantially supplemented or even replaced by
empirical works. Since 1970, five monetary macro models have come out
including money supply functions, three flow of funds analyses and
empirical studies of sub-sectors like the money market including that for
deposit substitute_ rural banks, _ural savings and portfolio choice. A
few empirical works on inflation were also undertaken. The studies,
however, suffer from lack of rigor in model building and care in the
statistical analysis. Mainly secondary data from the Central Bank were
used and some of the series like that on interest rate were not accurate.
The studies had rathem narrow focus and failed to take into account the
important inter-relationship in the market. Partly for these reasons
some of the findings are not conclusive or are inconsistent with each
other. The studies were also very much oriented to specific policies
and many hs_yet no empirical base. There are many areas that have not
been touched such as portfolio choice, interest rate structure, inter-
mediary behavior, market segmentation and capital flow.
The writer feels that a historical approach will be the more
interesting one to use at this time. This is the first review on the
country's literature. Moreover most of the studies are historical in
perspective. They were written in response to the issues of the time and
by available expertise.
The literatur_ is organized into six topics -- i) central
banking; 2) development finance and market segmentation; 3) sub-sectors3
securities and money market; 4) interest rate regulation and structure_
5) money supply function and price level; and 6) savings flow. Included
in 6 is the very important contribution of Hooley and Moreno's (1976)
analysis of the flow of funds. The section on central banking and
development finance is written as a historical paper. The rest of the
sections follow the mope conventional Peview of literatumeo
i. Central Banking
The history of the Philippine Central Bank and the evolution
of its policy properly begins when the Philippines obtained its
independence f_om the United States on July 4, 19_6. World War II just
ended and left the country terribly devastated. Fortunately, the
Philippines had a ready system of government to adopt, patterned after
the United States t. Moreover, Filipino leaders were already trained to
administer such government during the Commonwealth period. Upon assuming
independence, therefore, effo?ts of the new government concentrated on
normalizing conditions and establishing institutions needed to undertake
specific responsibilities. Among the first major institutions estaB-
lished was the Central Bank of the Philippines (CB).
The literature up to the early 60s was almost _otallyconcerned
with central banking and development finance. The 1947 Finance Commission
and three other American missions wrote on thekind of central bank that
,, }
suits the economy and alternative methods of financing economic develop-4
merit. Governor Cuaderno wrote numerous lectures on the same topic.
These were later compiled and published in his Guideposts to Economic
_tabilliTf ' and Progress (1955). He also wrote a primer on the Philippine
Central Bank (1949)_ and a memoir entitled Problems of Economic Develop-
merit (1960). The latter recalled his experience as a Governor and his
relationship with successive Presidents of the Republic from Roxas to
Garcla.
The Joint Philippine-US Finance Commission organized in
September 1946 by agreement of the Philippine and US Government recom-
mended the establishment of the Central Bank. Edgar G. Crossman headed
the American panel while Secretary of Finance Cuaderno headed the
Philippine group. The Commission was created to study the financial and
budgetary problems of the Philippine government. It was also asked to
recommend specific policies governing "taxes, budget_ public debt,
currency and banking reform, exchange and trade problems, reconstruction
and development". Among its major recommendations was the establishment
of a managed monetar_ system under the authority of a central bank. It
is to be noted that in 1937 Kemmerer wrote a volume dealing with the
p_oblems of using a gold-exchange standard. And at the outbreak of the
World War II Cuader_o was sent by President Quezon tO study alternative
monetary systems that the country might adopt. The Commission's efforts
were therefore not the first made for the transformation of the monetary
standard from gold exchange to a managed system. The Commission beganits work in mld-January 1947 and submitted its report April 25 of the
same year. Republic Act 265 otherwise known as the Central Bank Act
was passed. By this Act in June 194_ the country shifted to a managed
monetary system. The Central Bank started operating January 2_ 1949
with Miguel Cuaderno as its Governor.
Cuaderno made a considerable contribution to the formation
of a modern monetary system in the Philippines° He helped conceive a
Central Bank that would su_t the nation's needs° He nurtured it during
the country's difficult period of reconst_act_on from the war and its
first efforts at economic development. Even before the Finance Commission
was formed_ P_esident Roxas assigned Cuaderno to devise a suitable
charter for a central bank and suggest necessary changes in the currency
system° (Cuaderno, 1949)o Cuaderno then wrote and consulted central
banking experts in the United States. Among them were Robert Triffin
and Henry Wallich who were both with the Federal Reserve Board (Fed).
Triffin had just written _'Monetary and Banking Reform in Paraguay"
(1946). Cuaderno also referred to the recommendation of David Grove
also from the Fed for a Guatemalan-type of central bank° The central
banks of these countries were development-oriented. Cuaderno deemed
these to be more suitable models to Philippine needs than the Western
central banks. The latter are in general more concerned with stabili-
zation. Their powers are !im_ted to their responsibility for stab_lizationo6
The specific issues that concerned most Cuaderno and the
missions was the degree of independence of the Bank from fiscal authority
and degree of reliance on non-inflationaraj finance source for government
expenditures. President Roxas agreed that the Philippines _eeded a
development-orlented central bank. Such a central bank has to work more
closely with the fiscal authority for the financing of development
projects. The Bank has to help develop the financial system by encou-
raging the establishment of financial institutions, expanding the level
aBd variety of available credit instruments or financial assets and
influencing the allocation of credit to socially desirable projects or
sectors. LDC's typically have more serious problems on balance of
payments. Their export earnings are found to be a_ important constraint on
capital formation. Moreover, intez_national reserves form a much larger
component of domestic money supply thus making it sensitive to changes
in fomei_nexchange forms. For these reasons LDC central banks cannot
effectively operate independently of fiscal and planning agencies. The
Philippine Central Bank is thus responsible and empowered to decide on
the level, cost and allocation of money and credit, foreign trade and the
flow of foreign exchange. It is also expected to support government
security issues, control and assist financial institutions and serve as
a depository of govez_ment funds.
The Commission devoted two chapters on development financing.
The first was on government borrowing; the second on the need to expand7
and develop financial institutions. At that time 12 commercial banks
and The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) composed the financial
system. Of the twelve banks, five (5) were branches of foreign banks
and of The domestically incorpomated, two were owned by the Chinese, one
by American and two by the Catholic Church. The government-owned Philip-
pine National Bank (PNB) existed then, This leaves us with only one regular
indigenous private bank. The pattern of ownership of banks _eflects well
The colonial nature of The economy. Foreign banks serve the Trading
interest of the indus_ial foreign Trade enclave.
It was anticipated that the Government will rely on sources
other than taxes to finance its expenditures. These are foreign bor_ow-
ing_ domestic borrowing and printing money. That time the country was
already receiving a large inflow of dollars but this source was not
expected To continue beyond the 50s. Though The Commission was not
explicitly against The use of the printing press it argued strongly fom
domestic borrowing as a means to increase the mate of government invest-
ment and more importantly, to help develop the securities market. It
specifically recommended the extensive marketing of govergJnent securities
with attractive yields and liquidity features. This, according to the
Report, would help augment the small and unvaried portfolio being marketed
then. The securities would become an important fo_m of saving for the
community. It advised the government to give attractive interest rates.
Apparently, the first Commission work tackled less contro-8
versial issues. It mainly provided the institutional framework for The
shift from a gold-exchange standard to a managed monetary system. Its
recommendations on the Bank's objectives, responsibilities and powers
were followed by the government when it enacted the Central Bank Law in
June•1948. Concerned with the broad and fundamental issues of institu-
Ting a managed monetary system under the cenTal bank control, it did
not deal with some of the major issues like interest rate and selective
credit control policies°
A second important mission, the Bell Mission of 1950 under-
Took a comprehensive survey of the economic conditions of the country.
It set guidelines for The direction of future policies of the Philippines.
The Mission's Finance panel was headed by Edward Bernstein, then head of
the Economic Research Division of The International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Their report focused on the dwindling war-related capital inflow of U.S.
dollars. _This trend had direct implications on The balance of payments _
and the national budget, both being very dependent on this source of
funds. The Mission esZimated that the existing taxation system could
no_ be relied upon to pay for the prevailing and expected level of
expenditures. Revenue to GNP ratio was a little over 5 per cent only.
IT was anticipated that the Bank would be pressumed tO lend TO the
government if taxation and the market for gove,rnmen_ securities mem_ined
undeveloped. Cuaderno and the American advisers cautiOned the Philippines
to avoid the experience of having high inflation razes. Their report9
repeatedly admonished against _nflationary type of financingand recom-"
mended instead, highem tax rates for income and specific commodities.
It also recommended conditions for America's development aid_ _anted
through the Philippine Council fomUoS. Aid (Philcusa) one of which was
the raising of comporate income tax and indirect taxes on alcohol and
•tobacco._ /
Cuaderno was a conservative central banker who firmly believed
that stability was a pre-requisite of growth. He felt that one of the
most important deter_ents of economic development in underdeveloped
countries was the reckless use Of central bank credit. In his speech
to the Thimd National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers, Manila
Hotel, February 26, 1955 he argued that ... '_In almost ever,] case of the
/
less developed countries which resorted to the unbridled use of central
bank credit for financing economic development, the experience has been
one of failure and disappointment" (1955, po 158-159). As a general
premise, he stated that V'the basic legitimate source of capital funds
for use in the prosecution of an investment program, whether public or
private, is the saving of the community..." (Speech on Sources of
Development Capital_ 1955).
l--/Two Hundred Fifty million dollars ($250 million) was
granted to finance development projects over a period of five years.i0
Cuaderno's memoir was very insightful about problems of
maintaining a balance between central bank independence and monetary-
fiscal coordination. Because the central bank chosen for the Philippines
was development-oriented more direct coordination of fiscal and monetary
policy has to exist through the membership of the Secretary of Finance
in the Monetary Board, and the membership of the CB Governor in the
National Economic Council, the President's economic policy-making agency.
During President Magsaysay's and the first year of President Garcia's
administration, the independence of the Central Bank became an issue.
National Economic Chairman Council Araneta wanted a moreaggressive
financial policy. Govemnor Cuaderno strongly resisted deficit financing.
During this time his lectures concentrated on the dangers of inflationary
financing. To bring home his point he referTed to the advice of eminent
central bankers like Bernstein of the IMF and Grove and ExZer of the US
Federal Reserve Board. It might be concluded that the Governor succeeded
in maintaining his position against inflationary finance. In several
occasions his success was accomplished by his offer of resignation. It
would thus seem that given the organizational set-up of the Bank, its
independence depends very much on the personality of the governor and
according to Castro (1971) on his personal relation with the incumbent
executive 2/ a_
_'Apparently, he enjoyed personal rapport with Presidents
Roxas and Qulrino. There was little pressure on him during their
inhumbenCy. Conflict in policies was experienced during Presidents
Magsaysay and Garcia administration in which he used the threat Of
resignation about five times.ii
The success of Cuaderno's husbandry may be evidenced by the
fast pace of reconstruction and fairly rapid _owth rate of income and
industrialization of about six (6) per cent. Moreover, inflation was
practically nil in the first lO years of developmenZo Price level
increased moderately at less than five (5) per cent during The last three
years of his term. This record was exemplary in LDCs and the whole post-
independence history of the Philippines. A tradltionof stable price
may have been established probably determining Filipinos' degree of
tolerance of inflation in succeeding years. There was a strong reaction
to the high inflation rate of 1974-75_ and again in 1978-79.
Cuaderno seemed to be preoccupied with a deficit spending
during his ter_ to the neglect of other problems. The recommendations
of the 1947 and the 1950 missions regarding the development of the
securities market were not followed. The market remained undeveloped.
This mainly explains the use of the CB window as the main buyer of new
government issue_o Cuaderno made no statement on problems of marketing
securities.
There were no discussions either on the desired direction of
the financial market. A program for developing rural and development
banking was adopted to meet the financial requirements of priority
activities such as agriculture and specific industries. Cuaderno
in, flared The establishment of rural banks in 1951 and The expansion of
development banks in 1958. The policy followed however, may be considered12
highly segmented in orientation. This Continues to be used up to the
p_esent and has attracted some criticisms in the later years.
It may be argued that among Central Bank regulations, those
on interest rates probably exert the most profound impact on economic
and financial activities, Yet ther_ is no explicit policy on interest
rate. The foundation fo_ the currently controversial set of interest
rate regulations was laid in the 50s. Interest rates on three sets of
instruments were, controlled from the veTy beginning of central banking -
saving and time deposits, loans and discounts. The rates on saving, and
time deposits were first set at 3 and 3-1/2 per cent in 1957. These
were changed at long intervals, 4 and 5 per cent in 1964 and 5-3/4 and
6-1/2 per cent in 1966. New regulations were imposed between 1976 and
1978, The Central Bank offered no rationale for setting deposit rate
ceiling or choosing these levels.
The discount rate was set as an instrument of quantitative
and selective control of e_edit. The rates differed depending on the
governments credit priorities. At first the discount rates were set
according to the type of financial institution. In 1952, the rates were
2 pe_ cent for con_ercial banks and 1 1/2 per cent for,rural hanks.
These were lowered by one-half percentage points in 1954 then increased
by over 100 per cent in 1957. Beginning 1959_ these rates were set
according to priority activities -- for ag?iculture loans, 4 1/2 per
cent_ export bills, 5 pe_ cent and other loans 6 1/2 per cent. In 1962,13
additional priority areas were added to the discount rate schedule. The
discount rate was set at the very low rate of 3 per cent for loans to
the National Marketing Corporation, (NAMARC0) and seven (7) preferred
industrieS: faz_ning, fishing, food processing, textile and drug manufac-
turer, cassava, and veneer and plyw0odindustries.
The Central Bank also controlled yield on government securi_
ties. The rate on an issue was fixed up to its maturity since prices
were not allowed tO vary. The first _ublic bond issue offered a fixed
rate of 4 per cent which about equaled deposit rate. Subsequent issues
were offered at higher rates, also approximately following thedeposit
rates. Beginning 1968_ prices and therefore the yield on Treasury Bills
were allowed to be deter_ined by demand and supply forces.
While the discount and deposit rates were set by the Monetary
Board, lending rates were set by the 1916 Usur_ Law. The Law set a
ceiling on interest rates to be charged on secured and unsecured loans
at 12 and 14 per cent respectively. According to VanAtta (1970) this
Law was enacted on the basis of medieval value that "usuriOus" rates
were sinful.
Mapa (1961) and Van Atta (1870) argued that until about mid-
1960 the rates prevailing in the institutional market were low and
probably less than the corresponding Central Bank ceilings. The ceiling
rates were therefore ineffective and did not distort the allocationof credit and the flow of funds. Commercial banks were obsemved to be
in very liquid position. Excess reserves were maintained and discount
privileges not used. Mapa further observed that only the PNB used the
discount window until 1957. He noted that in 1957, private bank's
borTowing f_om the CB was only 10 per cent of total CB loan to banks.
The margin between the p_evailing loan rate of about 8 per'cent and
deposit rate or discount _ates of 3 to 4 per cent offered banks a wide
enough profit margin. Yet, banks maintained excess reserves and borrowed
minimally from the Central Bank. These observations led Mapa to argue
that the low demand for funds was small at the then prevailing rates.
t
The institutional setting changed since the mid60s. First,
the ceiling on loan and deposit mates became effective. There is enough
evidence to prove that the market Pate is higher than the legal maximum.
Secondly, the financial system substantially expanded in volume as well
as in the variety of institutions and claims. However, public and
publicly-supported banks remained dominant and continue to be important
media for selective credit control. Central Bank intervention increased.
There is a much larger number of regulations on interest rates, discounting
privileges and portfolio. All financial institutions now fall under the
direct control of the monetar,y authority. Ceiling rates have been
imposed on interest rates on deposit substitutes and other short-term
financial papers.iS
2. Development Finance and Mamket Segmentation
Recent literature analyzed the implications of many of these
policies. But on the whole the studies consider partial impact of
specific policy or set of policies and regulations. It will be helpful
to view the complex impact of policies from a common analytical frame-
work. In this sectionwe review the literature from the viewpoint of
how they affect the size and efficiency of intermediation. This frame-
work is borrowed from Gurley and Shaw's thesis and applied to segmented
markets (McKinnon),
The role of inter_ediation in development was analyzed by
Gurley and Shaw in their volume, Mongy in a Theory of Finance, and other
subsequent works. They show that the process of intermediation results
in lower risk, greater liquidity and better allocation of credit to
borrowers and portfolio mixes to _urplus units. Intercnedia_ies specia-
lize in borrowing and lending, In the process of intermediation
surpluses of d/fferent sizes of many units ame channelled into a large
pool of funds° This fund has a certain liquidity distribution which
permits the inter_nedia_ to lend portions of it at much longer maturity
than the maturity of the fund placed by individual lenders. The inter-
mediary can diversify his portfolio° It may lend to different types of
borrowers, different sizes and different maturities. It may also find
it p_ofitable to lend in different forcas of credit. On the othe_ hand
the intermediary may supply a variety of claims against itself in order toattract more funds. Risk is reduced by diversification oT both liabilities
and assets. The reduction in risk of the assets of inter_ediamies is
transmitted to surplus units' claims against the issuing intermediaries.
Each lender indirectly lends to the composite hot-cowers of the inter-
mediary. The pooling together of numerous funds into an intermediary
portfolio also permits the intermediary to guarantee its debtors _eeater
liquidity. In general liquidity increases with the size of the market
for claims. Specialization is also assumed to result in economies of
scale pamticularly in the acquisition and use of information. All these
advantages should_esult in lower cost of bomrowing and lower risk on
J
The portfolio holding of lenders.
Of greater importance than the above contributfon 0f financial
inter_ediation is the reduction in indivisibilities in portfolio and
investment choices. A surplus unit can lend any amount and buy a variety
of assets. A deficit unit can borrow any amount and also be able to
choose better borrowing ter_s. Dependence on internal finance is relaxed.
McKinnon gave a very simple and clear exposition of this result in his
model of market segmentation, Let us take two investors facing different
investment-saving choice over two time periods, 0, i, A is dependent on
internal finance, B faces a developed capital market.
Assume A has U function reflected in the indifference curves
A A • A His optimum point is Qiat which he UI, U2 ,.. and pmesent income Y0'
A and obtains future income C_. At point QI the saves and invests u _017
time preference rate and the marginal productivity of investmentare
equal to i + g.
Alte_native technology requiring a larger level of investment
is available. B can avail of this and choose between the two alternative
%echnlques and b'etween inter_al and/or external financing. Let us
assume the alternative technique to be 0B and the lending rate to be
1 + r on market line, MM. B can reach a higher IC curve, use
technique on 0B curve and borrow FcB0 .
Presumably the lending rate is lower given all the arguments
for inter_ediation., As long as The bor_owlng rate is lower than the
time preference natural of the investor, he can attain a higher level of
utility by borrowing and investing more. Being on 0B transfommation
curve allows B to obtain a much higher absolute returns to his investment.
McKinnon did not conside_ the impact of intermediation on portfolio
choice for the surplus unit. Let us take Chart 1 and assume the borrow-
ing and lending rate a_e equal. A traditional household facing a
_li_i[l be A bette_ Off by diversifying his-saving i_to productivity curve Y0
direct investment and lending to the inter_nediary. The optimal points in
A's case are direct investment _0 - IA from the tangency, of the lending-
AA boz%_owing curve and Y ,.'.lendingIoC02 at which a h2gher IC is Tangent to
the lending-borrowing curve. People with small income, unable to bor_ew
easily and have no. eni!_epreneurial ability are better off lending or
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Chart 1nations in an LDC assuming that majority of_households have small incomes.
The surplus which they can lend will also be •small.
These expected benefits from intermediation pPovide the
rationale for some development finance policies that we enumerated
earlier and which we will review in greater detail below. The policies
as a whole have conflicting impact on inter_nediation leading to possible
inefficiency in credit allocat_on and pomtfolio choice. They also might
have lead to new forms of segmentation.
Placido Mapa's doctoral dissertation (1961) is the country's
first study on development finance and has remained a ma_o_ work in the
area_ He traced the development of each type of financial institution
existing then - commercial, rural, development banks and a few specia-
lized credit agencies of the government - giving their quantitative
deve!.oplnent f_om 19_9 to 1959_ An important segment of the financial
market consisted of publ_c and publ_cly-supported institutions. These
were established by law to serve the economy's particular credit needs.
In 1951, the Rural Bank Act was passed providing for the
establishment of rural banks all over the country. These were intended
to cater to small producers in _umal areas and encourage the flow of surplus
funds into the banking sector. The Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) was established in IB54 _eplaeing the Reconstruction and Finance
Co_poration (RFC). The reconstruction period was practically completedz0
by early 1950. Financing of industry and agriculture was then the new
priority of the govez_nment. The DBP was to pmovide credit to priority
industrial activities. In 1955, the 1916 charter of the Philippine
National Bank, was amended allowing this public commercial bank some
investment functions. In 1958, the Law providing for the establishment
of private development banks was passed. Both DBP and PNB are purely
public banks. Rural banks and private development banks are private but
are subsidized by the Central Bank for capitalization and funds for
operation. Other specialized credit agencies like the National Develop-
ment Corporation and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administra-
tion were also established during this period.
The PNB and the DBP became the main financial medium through
which the government directed credit allocation. Mapa observed that
the commercial banks cannot solely provide credit for industrial and
agricultural development. In 1954, 46 per cent of their credit went to
real estate. 0nly 9.5 per cent were to industry and an insignificant
percentage to agriculture. By 1959, credit for industry rose to 26 per
cent. The increased rate of credit allocation to industry was due to
the mushrooming of new banks with ownership management links to indus-
tries (Mapa, 1961, p. 126). But the bulk of funds of private investment
still came from the three government and govemnment-supported banks.
Their importance in development finance continues to the present. In
70s, they granted a total credit of about 40 to 50 per cent of total21
credit granted. But while interest rate ceilings were not intervening
in the market, these public institutions expanded the volume of credit
available to activities not financed by private commercial banks or had
no access to institutional credit. Mapa then focused on the quantita-
tive development of these institutions. A chapter each was devoted to
the development of commercial, rural, development banks and othe_
financial institutions. His thesis contains a more detailed history of
financial development. Cur_ent!y , the ceiling rates were found to be
substantially lower than market rates. This fact profoundly influenced
the level and relative cost of credit suppl_ed by the different financial
institutions. The phenomenon has also attracted a lot of interest in the
70s.
There is a long interval between Mapa's study and subsequent
works dealing with financial development. Gallardo (1972) w_ote a
repomt for use by the Joint IMF-CB Banking Sur_ey Commission entitled
"The Structure of the Financial System of the Philippines, 1950-1970".
A large part of the report was devoted to a discussion of Gurley and
Shaw's theor_ of finance and Central Bank megulations on financial opera-
tions of the various types of intermediaries. Secondary data on sources
and uses of funds of bank and non-bank intermediaries were presented.
His point was that non-bank intermediaries for_ a very large segment of
the market and they should therefore be under direct control of the
Central Bank for more effective monetary policy. The system wis shown22
to grow very rapidly from 1960 to 1970 with banking institutions _owing
in nominal term at 50 per cent per year and non-banks at 23 per cent.
He also showed that deposit l_abilities_ere a major source of funds for
commercial and thrift banks only. Rural and development banks depended
on other liaDiliti_s - the for_,er on CB accomodati0ns; the latter on
bond issue. Rural banks relied on about a third and DBP on l0 per cent
of their funds from deposit liabilities. Gallardo also gave data on the
allocation of credit by broad industrial sector by these financial
institutions. These data are from secondary sources and a_e highly
aggregated and so shed no new light on the allocation and other problems
of development finance. His interest lies mainly in showing the rela-
tive sizes of bank and non-bank financial institutions in order to argue
that monetary control should directly extend to this financial sector.
In fact this recommendation was adopted by the Central Bank in 1972,
A third study on development finance recently done by the
World Bank was part of its 1978 Country Report on the Philippines. This
was however, more narrowly focused on the market for short-term instruw
ments. The chapter provided another empirical description of the growth
in number and size of the different types of financial institutions f_om
1962-71. In 1950 less than 15 commercial banks having 87 branches
existed. These formed the bulk of the market as the Other bank and non-
bank intermediaries has not been established° Table 1 of the Report























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































much larger variety of institutions have spread geographically. Between
1961 and 1972, new important institutions were established. The Private
Development Corporatlon of the Philippines (PDCP), the first investment
bank began to operate in 1964. This was followed shortly by Baucom and
other investment companies. Savings and loan assosication or thrift
banks did not develop until the 70s. The market, however, has remained
dominated by commercial banks and government established intermediaries.
The World Bank Report considered development mainly from the
quantitative viewpoint and failed to analyze the pattern of financial
development. Tan (1974, 1976) speculated that the pattern may be
explained partly by the selective impact of,the development policy used
by the Central Bank. The relative rate of g-_owth of the intermediaries
was also partly in response to the growth of demand for new fOrthS
of assets and their supply. _le thrust of the financial development
policy was to subsidize specialized institutions such as the mural and
private development banks. These have been granted extremely favorable
credit for their initial capital and to augment their loanable funds.
Up to 50 per cent of their equity requirement may be obtained from the
Central Bank° The discounting/loan ratio allowed them is generally
higher than other banks. The discount rate charged is lower. The
two public banks, DBP and PNB are used as media for financing priority
activities and quantitative expansion of money supply,26
While generous credit incentives are granted to these public
or semi-public institutions they were more effectively Covered by the
legal ceiling on loan and deposit rates. Other financial institutions
in contrast were more innovative in issuing instruments not legally
restricted by law om Central Bank rules.
This policy on financial development has been criticized by
Tsiang (1975) and Tan (197_ 1976). The credit and interest rate policy
on commercial and rural banks has virtually given them opportunities for
earning monopoly profits. In Tan's work she enumerated and described
briefly the various forms of intervention on financial institutions.
These are regulations on their establishments, portfolio ratios to be
maintained and the rates of interest to be paid on deposits. The
controls imposed seem not to be consistent with the objective of develop-
ing the financial market. Examples Of these are: commercial and rural
banks are given discounting incentives for expanding their loanable
funds. At the same time they are restricted from offering deposit rates
high enough to attract placement of savings in deposits. In response to
these two inconsistent regulations, banks _elied on discounting rather
than to borrowing larger amounts from a bigger number of depositors.
This is specially t_ue of rural banks which are allowed lower discount
rates than the ceilings on deposits. A second inconsistency Tan cited
is the policy to expand credit while simul#taneously fixing both loan
and deposit rates at low levels. Excess demand for loans at the ceiling27
rates Then occurred° In response to excess demand private financial
institutions charged effective Pates higher Than the ceiling rates. The
differential between the effective and ceiling rates were supposed to be
hidden in service charges and retention of loan proceeds in the lending
banks. Public and publicly supported banks giving longer term loans on
The other hand strictly followed megulat_ons on rates_ Perverse struc-
ture of interest rates therefore results. Longer term loans granted by
public financial _nstituati0ns are charged the legal ceiling, Shorter-
ter_ loans predominantly granted by private banks are charged h_gher
Pates. A smaller volume of funds are thus collected from surplus units
at the prevailing ceiling then would have been collected in a more
freely-operating market.
S.C. Tsiang discussed The monopoly-llke effect of CB regula-
tions on discounting and interest rate. The effect of the interest and
discounting policy is analyzed graphically below. A supply of funds
curve is assumed including interm_diation cost as $S, and demand for
funds DD. Ceiling rates on deposits is set at rd made equal to discount
rate and ceiling rate for loan as _i' Both rd and r£ are fixed lower
than the equilibrium rate re . Demand for loans is L 3 and supply is L1
at the fixed rates. If banks are allowed To borrow from the CB L2 - L1
they are able to earn profits of (rl - _d ) L2' If on top of this they
are able to price discriminate and charge selected (large) borrowers
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abnormal profits as long as CB allowsthem to borrow large sums at the
Unreasonably low rate. Monopoly power is protected by restricting entry
through licensing of new hanks. A related policy encourages bank merger
by imposing larger equity/debt ratio for existing banks and larger
initial capital for new banks.
Some rather spotty empirical support for the implications of
the policies on bank behavior is given in some studies. Hooley and
Moreno's flow of funds analysis for 1962-65 showed that commercial banks
plowed in profits composed an extraordinarily large part of (about one-
third) their total sources of funds. These banks readily discount at
the Central Bank. Funds from pure intermediation_ i.e., deposits, form
relatively small part of their total funds. The next table, also from
the World Bank Report_ discloses that funds flowing to savings and time
deposits decreased in relation to the total flow into short-term assets.
On the other hand, Gallardo (1972) and Tan (1976) found that rural banks
obtain more than 50 per cent of their loanable funds from Central Bank
discount window. The slow growth in deposit sources is likely to have
been due to the low effective deposit rate offered and to the low dis-
count rates.
We may conclude that the combination of development finance
strategies adopted including those an interest rate and credit incentive
g_anted priority industries and specialized financial institutions tend
to have mixed results. The financial system definitely expanded in3O
number as well as in size. Its geographic reach has also increased as
shown by the more dispersed location of banks. Mapa, Gallardo and the
World Bank studies evidenced this development well. Financial growth
was partly due to the policies adopted. For this reason it might be
argued that the institutional development here was essentially a supply-
leading rather than demand-following as classified by Patrick (_966).
To the extent that funds have become available through inter-
mediaries the constraints on self-financed choices of levels of invest-
ments and techniques have been reduced. Those able to borrow from the
market have definitely benefited by bein_ able to borrow to finance
investments of larger scale and at a lower interest cost. The policies
do not guarantee, however, efficient allocation of funds among all prospec-
tive projects. Strong arguments are brought out in the literature that
credit allocation tends to be inefficient in a regime with interest rate
and other control. Hardly any empirical work has been done to support
these amguments. There were newspaper reports on bankruptcy of government
bank-supported projects. There is evidence of over-investment or low
utilization rate of subsidized industries such as sugar milling, cement,
hotels, etc. Velasco (1969) found that DBP gives a heavy weight to value31
collateral in its allocation criteriaand not as much. on productivity.
D B P was also foUnd (vibal, 1_9) to c6ncentrate its lending on
large scaleprojects. These give suppo_t_'to_ithe arguments but more_
empirical work on credit allocation is needed.
The negative effects on inter_aediation of the interest rate
policy have been recognized. The allowable deposit rates are found to
be unreasonably low and therefore unattractive to savers. The analysis
at the beginning of this section (Please mefer to Figure i) shows how
low deposit rate in banks detracts savers from lending to them. House-
holds are thereby encouraged to engage in low-productivity self-financed
enterprises. They are also discouraged from specializing in production
activities in which they have a comparative advantage.
Credit policieshave implications on other aspects of inter-
mediation. These are reviewed in the next two sections. Two segments
of the market are studied - the securities market and the money market.
The first is found %o be a lagging sector_ the latter_ a rapidly g_owing
one. It will be seen that this pattern of development is partly
explained by policies.
3. Securities Market
Equity shares and bonds are _ot popular borrowing instruments,
Theme is hardly any pmivate bond issue and the volume of equity shares32
&_ew very slowly compared to direct loans. Valenzona (1970) argued
that firms preferred To borrow from financial institutions, espec_ally
from public or publicly supported banks such as the DBP, PNB and rural
banks. The cost of borrowing from Them was lower Than from primary
securities. Others pointed to the fact that most Philippine corporation_
are family corporations. These families prefer to exercise full control
and have the business _dentified as Theirs. Some would argue that
floating securities is cumbersome. All these probably explain why firms
hesitate to become public.
Co_poratlon retur_ rate is found to range very widely from
about 7 per cent to 50 per cent. Many are earning about 35 per cent
rates. Lending rate is much lower than corporate return rate of 14 To
19 per cent for long ter_ loans. Lending rates were even lower before
The 70s. Large corporations engaged in priority activities borrow at
preferred rates from The public banks. Family profits Therefore can be
maximized by financing activities through bank loans instead of equiTies_
Equities, however, are issued when the capital r_quiremenT is Too large
to be accommodated by banks. According to a CB regulation, banks can
lend up To l0 per cent of the bank equity to any one boz_ower. This may
be the reason why only very large corporations like those engaged in
mineral or oil exploitation are largely public.
Papers on governemnt securities are mostly criticism on
policies related to deficit financing and marketing of securities.Until 1966, only long-term securities financing specific public works
projects were issued, Their prices and interest rates were fixed at
instruments face values. These wer_ sold in auction at chosen time
intervals, usually weekly in the last few years. The effective rates
varied depending on the auction bid prices. Long-ter_nbonds are stil_
issued at fixed prices and rates. Those with unreasonably low rates
issued in the 50s and 60s were discarded.
Both short and long-term securities having fairly competit_
rates are now available. Despite their attractiveness, they do not fc
an important part of the stock of securities transacted. Moreover the
financial system failed to develop a secondary marke_ for government
secumities. The transaction remained bilateral between bidders and th
Central Bank. The latter issues and markets government securities at
auction and repumchase time. betwee_ financial institutions, or the
and large individual holders.
It is noteworthy that among the advices of the first three
Missions to the Philippines, that on the development of The securities
market was ignored. The fimst Mission recommended for an effective
marketing of government securities to provide non-inflationary sour(
of financing _overnment deficits and increasing the volume and variet_
of issues transacted in the securities market. The Bell (1950) and
Bernsteln (1955) Missions pursued this recommendation. Mapa's study
(1961, p. 55) mentioned That Governor Cuaderno intended to sell to the34
public the first bond issue. Cuaderno did not discuss what marketing
mechanics to use . Instead, he discussed the inflationary danger
posed when the Central Bank purchase new issues.
No discussion was made on the criteria the Central Bank use/
for choosing the rates on particular issues and fixing the rate at levc
originally stated. The Bernstein Mission recommended offering high ra
and other attractive features such as tax offset and liquidity. Floats
attractlve government bills was assumed to help develop the securitier_
market as a whole by expanding its volume and lead to the development c
a secondary market.
Toward the mid 1960s, a need for a market for short-ter_
assets was felt. At about this time the money market was beginning to
evolve, especially on interbank call loans. The Economic Development
Foundation, (EDP) a non-profit private association of business leaders
and economists organized in February, 1966 a seminar entitled "An Intrc
duction to a Sho?t-Ter_ Treasur_y Bill Market in the Philippines".
Andres Castillo, then Governor of the Central Bank_ Sixto Roxas, P_esi-
dent of Bancom_ Herman Frenzel, Vice President for Sales and Trading in
Government Securities Division of the Bankers Trust, N.Y,, and Chester
Babst, Executive Vice President of the Pacific Banking Corporation g_'-
the lectures.
The lectures mevolve around two themes -- a) The need for
and the functions of a short-ter_ securities market and b) the market':
desired features to enable it to meet these needs.35
Castillo began with a brief discussion of the Bank's failure
to develop the securities market. He went onsaying:
"For the past 17 years, since the Central Bank was
organized in1949, we have tried to develop an active govern-
ment securities market in this country. We have a department
in the Central Bank, the Securities Market Department, which
was organized precisely to perform this job. We have tried
our best to educate the public in dealing -a in the buying and
selling of government bonds; but in spite of our efforts, we
have not quite succeeded in reaching a desirable stage where
government securities could be bought and sold as a means of
monetary control. If there were securities in the past that
the government saw fit to issue, we tried to market the
securities as best we could and to get them accepted by the
economic community at large. We have employees in the Secu-
rities Market Department who go around the country telling
the people what government bonds are and _ncourag_ng them to
save part of their incomes by buying 4% R _ D Bonds which
still form the backbone of the securities market in this
country. Despite such efforts we have not been able to drum
up enough enthusiasm to influence the community to invest an
increasing portion of their income in government securities.
Today, with interest rates soaring to unheard of levels, a
4% bond may appear unattractive as a form of saving even in
rural communities and inspite of the safety feature and
other guarantees it carries. And it is for this reason
perhaps why only the banks and theCentral Bank are the main
holders of this type of government security today.
Banks have purchased them mostly, if not exclusively,
for reserve purposes but not as an investment which could
be counted upon %o yield a return attractive to the stock'
holders. While we have issued almost all types of govern-
ment securities which you would find in a highly developed
country such as treasury bills, certificates of indebtedness,
treasury notes and !ong-tez_n bonds, they are merely fore-
runners of what we should really trade in more actively in
the years to come. Treasury bills have been issued -- for
that matter, all types of government securities have been
issued at fixed prices, at fixed rates of interest, and
except for one issue these have been bought by buyers showing
different degrees of willingness. In most cases, we have had
to use persuasion, or disguised threats, to make them invest
in these govez_ment securities.36
But to a Central Bank, it is really the treasury bill
that should foz_ the core of open market operations. This
type of security should be well-known in the financial commu-
nity and should be freely traded in as a means not only of
investment, but as a means of influencing money supply and
the credit operations of the financial institutions in this
country."
It might be instructive to list the f_nctions of the short-
term market as enumerated by Frenzel in the seminar.
a) "Number one, we want to harness cash flow. Corporations generate
hot money: 3-day money, 17-day money, 22-day money which can be
put effectively to use in a short-term money market."
b) _'Second_ weVd like to employ some of the excess reserves of the
banks. Now_ admittedly, an occasion, there is no such thing as
excess reserves. However, on a Friday_ there's invariably some
money that could be invested ove_ the weekend. Some only for short
spans -- 15-day, 18-day, 22-day periods, but the funds are availabl_
for employment at a rate."
c) "Third, we want to create market liquidity. We want to create an
instrument which is money good on the spot, which has a free market_
is quoted regularly, that each investor has ready access to."
d) _'Wewant to establish a key rate. In the U.So, the key rate is the
90-day bill Pate. Other rates are geared to this. Of course, from
a Central Bank view, the key rate is the discount rate, and private
loans and other market loans are geared from that level."
e) "Another objective of the money market is to enable the Central Ban]_
to perform its open market operations effectively. I have taken
great care to read the Central Bank Act."
f) "What is a money market dependent upon? This would be the next
logical step, and first and foremost is the fact that there should
be a flow of short-term funds seeking temporary investments. These
short-term funds can come from any source you want. Again, the
insurance company, the corporation, the bank. I repeat the same
names. They do have funds on occasion. This would give you your
flow of funds ."
One may conclude from his statement that Governor Castillo
understood what is needed to develop a market for securities. There mu_37
be a secondary market similar to the stock exchange and trading must be
unincumbered by interest rate and other restrictions. In fact he under-
stood that securities with a fixed yield of 4 per cent could not possibly
sell when rates on other assets were higher. Yet his recommendations
for establishing a secondary market was not implemented.
The succeeding governor, Alfonso Calalang also recognized the
need and the desired features of a securities market. He argued as
follows:
Now_ what are the prerequisites of effective market
operations especially in a developing country like ours?
First, to my mind_ would be the availability of an adequate
supply and variety of securities that should be freely traded.
Seeondly_ there must be a flexible interest rate system which
should respond not only to The type of security offered but
also to the availability of funds for investment. And then
the securities that are Traded must not be fixed in price as
they are Today. Except for one issue -- the 7% government
bond -- all the prices were fixed in at par in the past. And
even the first attempt to sell a security that should have
been sold without any fixed price did not quite succeed in
attaining that objective. A Third requisite may be the deve-
lopment and g_owth of specialized institutions which would
assume the risks of the market.
f
There are different procedures in open market Opera-
tions. In some centers, central banks deal with private inter-
mediaries such as dealers_ discount houses or brokers. This
is the case in Canada and England and the United States.
Private intermediaries who deal in these securities obtain
their funds through short-ter_n loans from banks. In addition
the market may also include private companies with excess
funds who may wish to use them to purchase liquid but interest-
yielding securities. Sometimes the Central Bank grants ad-
vances To be used in these transactions. In other cases, a
sale of government securities carmies a repurchase agreement
by the Central Bank. Many central banks deal directly with
commercial banks who become the principal agents of under-
w_ _nd secumities dealers. In other countries, central38
banks deal with the specialized public institutions. This
holds true in Belgium where a public intermediary has been
established by the Central Bank to deal in government securi-
Ties. Certain features of this method might be considered in
establishing an active market for government securities in
the Philippines. Of coumse, I suppose the procedure _at will
be adopted will aim to develop a market by "feel" and will be
directed towards determining the most f_uitful and most effec-
tive means of drumming up enough interest in treasury bills
and other government securities here.
He also explained in the follwoing statements why the market
did not develop.
"The market has not been developed because, usually_
the government is unable or unwilling (or both) to borrow at
current rates of interest. As of the end of 1965, 69 per
cent of outstanding issues carried interest rates of 4% and
below. It is our objective to decrease this percentage and
see that these securities are sold at current mamkeT prices°
Moreover, government securities a_e not regularly issued at_
say every 90 days or every year or some other fixed period.
They are issued only when the government needs additional
resources to meet its obligations rather than in responds to
the liquidity requirements of the economy. I believe it is
about time that we adopt a more sophisticated system and
develop a wider and deeper securities market here so that
government issues can serve not only as a means of satisfying
the financial requirements of the government but also as an
instrument of monetary management.
Governor Castillo stated the government considered the interest
cost or debt servicing of The issues when deciding on the rates and not
its potential contribution to financial development or to banking stabi-
lity. It is to be noted the Monetary Board of CB directly decides on
bond issue. The Governor cannot therefore divorce motives of the govemn-
ment from those of the CBo
The literature has not helped shed light on the marketing39
problems of government securities. There is almost zero private indivi-
dual holdings of government securities since most are held by financial
institutions and large eo_porations. Financial institutions find them an
attractive form of primary reserves since they earn relatively high
interest rate (comPared to zero rate on reserve deposits). It might be
safely argued that the_e exist private demand fo_ government securities
which are not met because the issues are not available to them. This
leads to the potential of securities as an important form of savings.
4. Money Market
Activities in the money market attracted much attention in
the the early 70s. Transactions in short-term interbank and large
company claims increased rapidly. In one year it quadrupled (1972-73).
The rate of interest fluctuated widely reaching up to about 40 per cent
at times. Because of the relatively high rates offered in this market,
it attracted funds from commercial and other intermediaries. The
Monetary Authority became concerned that funds that otherwise would have
gone into longer-term uses flowed instead into short-term assets.
Evidence cited was the heavy participation of investment banks in money
market activities. (Investment banks are considered to specialize in
longer-term financing.) It is true funds flowed into these new fo_ms of
assets - interbank-call loans, bank acceptances and large company papers.
But there is no a priori reason to say that this movement resulted in the40
shortening of the maturity structure of financial assets. It is to be
noted that interbank boz_owing dominated the Transactions. So long as
they are made to fill reserve deficiencies, The effect on the supply of
funds outside the money market will tend to be positive_ not ne_atlve.
The state of knowledge in the Philippines about this market
seems to be quite poor. The literature is very sparse and there is
little written explaining The _volution of the market, what are the
implications ef its transactions in the saving-investment process and on
intermediary portfolio, and how its borrowers and lenders behave. It is
likely that this market developed as a Way of diversifying lendin_ and
borrowing ter_s. As the financial mamket expands, it offers new forms
of financial claims to meet the varied preferences for liquidity and
riskiness of borrowersand lenders. In the Philippines money market
instruments are relatively new forms of assets. It is also possible
that the rapid _owTh in the early 70s was in response to the increasingly
restmictive inte_st rate ceiling. The 70s, it is to be recalled, has
much higher mates of inflation rendeming the nominal ceiling rates un-
tenable. This market might have been a legitimat_ _ay Of evading_he interest
rate regulations. Until 1976 This market was not covered by the regula-
tions. Money market _a_sac_ions weme conducted in a special segment of
¢
the market. There thus _esultsprice discrimination between ordinary
lenders which recelvethelow regulated deposit ?ares and the large
investors which ar_ given The money market rate. There is some evidence41
that private banks discriminate also among lenders. Banks are found
to differ as to their (hidden) loan rates. The observed variation in
rates cannot readily be interpreted as price discrimination without
further study.
Irma Clemente's d_esis (1975) is an important pioneering
work on the money market. She provided primary data on interest rate
and a portfolio of a sample of dealers, She also gave a brief
history of the money market tracing its growth f_om 1961. Interbank
call loans were the first instruments used in the market. When the
banks' reserve position tightened in 1960s they resorted to trading
in excess reserves, In the United States banks as a whole tried to
economize on reserves by lending the excess reserves of some banks to
those with deficiency. Similar transactions took place with individual
and company funds. Surplus funds of certain individuals and companies
were lent to those with short-tern requirements. This type of trans-
action tends to involve large sum as individual lenders and borrowers
are matched, S_aller transactions are made through the usual deposit
and loans or the securities market.
Bancom pioneered in offering new instruments. Its commer-
cial papers and bankers acceptances grew _apidly. Some dealers experienced42
a doubling of trade in a yea_, but most showed growth rates of about 30
to 40 per cent per year, Interbank call loans dominated trading but
later bankers' acceptances, repurchase agreements and other dealer papers
issued by financial institutions composed 81per cent of total transac-
Tion in 1974. Co_nercial papers issued by corporations and government
short-ter_ securities played a small role in this market.
Using Central Bank data, Clemente provided a good description
of the monthly movement of interest rates on various instruments and
their distribution from 1971-74. From a survey of 30 dealers consisting
of Three (3) investment houses and seventeen (17) commercial banks she
described the portfolio pattern and trade turnover of the dealers.
Finally, she hypothesized and fitted by regression monthly interest rate
functions for each type of instrument -- interbank call loans_ treasury
bills and commercial papers. Money supply, consumer price index, foreign
exchange reserves and stock price index were used as arguments. The
first three variables were found to be significant explanatory variables
of interest rate. Thei_ coefficients, however, differed substan_ially.
The author did not explain why there should be this variation.
The interest rate structure and their wide monthly fluctuation
over the year is noteworthy. In 1971 the rate of interbank loans fluc-
tuated between the range of 6.50 in January to 18.0 in November. In
1972 the range was 8.25 (January) and 20.0 (August) then 3.25 (September)
and 12.0 (December) in 1973; 10.3 (February) and 18.0 (May) in 1974. The4 3
fluctuaxion was substantial even on a day to day basis, qhere was a
wide rate differential among the _nstruments transacted -- inte_%ank
call loans, treasury bills and commercial papers. A two to three
percentage points differential was frequently experienced. _lis rose to
as high as five percentage points _n some months. It was alleged that
the intere$ _ rate fluctuated even more widely on individual day to day
transactions than was reflected in the monthly averages. On several
occasions it rose to more than 40 pet, cent. Roxas (1977, p. 42) mentioned
the rate to have reached this level. The rate could be jacked up to the
penalty rate of 42 per cent on reserve deficiency imposed by the Central
Bank. A bank deficient in reserves can be made tO pay through the noose
by the lender bank. Roxas explained the causes of this problem. First,
he pointed that banks do not hold sufficient secondary reserves. He
further observed the lack of any pattern of portfolio composition of
reserves held by banks. Some banks hold minimal secondary reserves,
others up to 50 per. cent of required reserves_
Clemente (1975) gives empirical support to this argument.
The bulk of money market transactions was on in te_bank call loans and
bankers acceptances. Secondary reserves in the form of treasury bills
other than government secu_itles and commercial papers were relatively
small. Part of the _overnment securities held already forms thei_
primary reserves. As such it cannot be counted as secondary reserves.
Consequently banks tended to rely on the Central Bank and other banks to
meet their reserve and unexpected credit needs.R o x a s blames balanc_ of payments flows as the main
deter_ninant of banks _ liquidity and reserve position. He cited the
liquidity squeeze in 1970, 1971, and 1974. These according to him
resulted from deficits in the balance of payments. 1_e market was
considered '_nommal _; during the last quarter of 1972 and 1973 when The
country earned a surplus -- foreign exchange transactions. Another
reason given was the lumpiness of withdrawals by some depositors -- the
government, foreign companies and importers. Large withdrawals by a few
clients can easily lead to a reserve deficiency for the depository bank.
Roxas recommends a gradual build-up of commercial bank secondary reserve
levels. He also suggested to allow banks to mediscount secondary
reserves for a minimum of about 30 days to enable them to fill their
primary reserve deficiency. Thus dependence on interbank loan is _educedo
Roxas indirectly recommended the freeing of deposJt rates when he men-
tioned that banks cannot expand deposits when they are in a tight situa-
Tion brought about by the legal ceilings on these rates.
Apparently_ Roxas estimated the _elat_onship between interbank
Pate and excess resemves on one hand, and interbank and commercial paper
rate on the other. He did no% discuss the method used to obtain The
_elationship. But he stated that '_when excess reserve position of the
entire system is zero_ the interbank call rates settled at between 11.6
and 12.6 peru cent per annum, and for every FIO0 million tha_ the banking
systems reserve position is in defieit_ the interbank call _ates rise45
between 1.4 and 2.2 per cent per annum" (Roxas, 1976, p. 46). He found
that interbank rates were the leading _ates in the money market and were
closely correlated with commercial paper rates. Notably_ the rates on
These two papers •move very closely but they fluctuated more widely than
those •on Treasury Bills. The very narx,ow secondary market of T_easury
Bills may explain why Their rate is more stable. Besides, transactions
in these bills mostly take place when originally issued.
Speculation allegedly resulted f_om the interest rate movement.
One big commercial bank_ the Continental Bank, failed because it was
over-extended in the money mamket activities. Genbancor, an investment
bank_ followed suit a few years after the Continental Bank debacle.
Though no empirical work was done to support these allegations, they
alarmed The Central Bank. It then requested an IMF-CBP study of the
money market in 1976. The Report first provided a theoretical framework
for studying money market instruments° The theory used is the portfolio
choice among competing instruments, following the Theory of demand fo_
money. A very large part of the Report was devoted to theory which is
very useful to Central Bank officials as well as to students of money.
Thei_ empirical analysis following the theoretical discussion is, however9
very brief. The movement from 1974.-76 (the years when official statistics
from the Central Bank became available) of total transactions, their
distribution among the instruments46
transacted and their respective rates we?e traced. The degree of
variation in rates in the Philippines and the U.S. was compared. This move-
ment was found not to differ siznificantly. This conclusion needs
to be qualified by the fact that the rates used were monthly averages
which tended to even out the wide _,eekly oF even daily fluctuations.
They do not reflect the individual rates on cases which according to
Roxas and other bankers reached _2 per cent_
While Roxas and Clemente were concerned with the whole money
market the IMF-CBP researchers focused on deposit substitutes. The
study made an important clarification as to which assets/liabilities
should be appropriately included as deposit substitutes. It is to be
noted that inter-hank loans and deposits are transacted mainly to
improve the liquidity and reserve position of banks (and other financial
institutions). Deposit substitutes on one hand_ and, commercial
papers, non-hank repumchase agreements and banker's acceptances, on the
othe_ hand, are respectively intermediary liabilities and assets.
Transactions in these result in intermediatlon between savers and
investors.
The study gave a fairly detailed analysis of the
characteristics of deposit substitutes including (a) the distribution
of holding whether private, public, institutional, individual or non-
financial corporation; (b) their distribution by issuing institution,47
and (c) their maturity structure. Commercial banks are observed to
issue the bulk of deposit substitutes. Its share increased
gradually from about 50 per cent in 1973 to 62 per cent by the middle
of 1976. Investment banks issued the second largest portion but their
share declined from 31 per cent to 21 per cent over the same period.
It is noted that thrift banks issued a negligible amount of these de-
posits (IMF-CBP , 1976 Report, T. 12, p. 50).
The main holders of these assets are private individuals and
!
non-flnancial corporations. In 1976 a little over 80 per cent of
placement camefrom this source in commercial banks and almost 70 per
cent in quasi banks. In the latter institutions private holding showed
a r_sing trend from 52 per cent in 1974. Transactions were in very
large units - 70 per cent were in _I.0 million and above with 2/3 of
these in _2.0 million or more. More than 80 per cent of the papers
had maturities of 90 days or less, 16 per cent bein_ call loans.
The data may be interpreted to show that deposit substitutes
have become an attractive alternative to regular deposits, AS seen
from The }{orld Bank Report (1976) their absolute growth (_2.9 billion
had overtaken ordinamy deposits (_2.0 billion) by 1972. (Please see
Table 2 for the annual changes in the composition of gross financial
assets.) It is to be noted tha_ they started to be offered in 1965
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































whole they grew fairly rapidly over the decade 1965-1975.
We hinted at the beginning of this section that intermedlation
in the money market was partly a move by financial institutions to price
discriminate between small and large lenders. Instead of payins a
uniform rate on all deposits banks maximize profits by payin_
regulated rates to ordinary small depositors, borrowing from the CB part
of its funds, and offering deposit substitutes to large depositors.
Going to Chart 3 we assume SS and DD to be the supply of and demand
for •funds to all banking institutions, r is the equilibrium interest e
rate, _i is the ceiling on loan rate_ and rd is the ceiling deposit
rate. Let us assume fumther that the bank can borrow at SIS 2 at the
same rate as r%. Banks experiencing excess demand may offer a _ate
below r . Additional supply of funds are forthcoming along the SS
e
curve from point M tO O. They borrow $2S3, and lend at re. Banks
may however pay any rate below r . Profits will be higher When they
e
borrow on the lower position of M0 curveg that is at rd _ where
!
the additional supply $1S1 is just equal to additional loans S2S 3.
Banks can therefore increase profits by segmenting the market into the
regulated and free parts. Profits can be further increased by
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Following this analysis it would seem that the more interesting
behaviou_ to study is That of the intermediaries rather than the wealth
holders. Obviously the latter will prefer to hold deposit substitutes
instead of savings or time deposits when there is a wide yield
differential between them. The liquidity and risk :of these Two issues
are not too diffement since both are liabilities of the same51
institution(s) and have similar specified maturities. With regard to
t
intermediar.y behaviour the following questions may be raised: To what
extent do they exercise monopoly power in interest rate decisions?
What is the de_ree of discrimination in the free market? What are their
allocative impacts?
The IMF-CBP study applied a theory of portfolio choice to
demand for deposit substitutes. They hypothesized and tested the
following functions:
I. Demand for deposit substitutes is a function of GNP,
rediscount rates and a dummy variable fop time,
2. Rate on deposit substitutes is a function of GNP and
real money supply.
It is not clear whether this demand function is one by
wealthholders or by intermediaries. These functions are not adequately
explained. There is a need for more rigorous analysis of portfolio
choice by savers and by financial institution. Unfortunately there is
hardly any literatume on portfolio behaviour of financial institutions
except for the empirical descmiption of the sources and uses of funds
such as the studies of Hooley and Moreno (1976) and the World Bank
Country Repor_ (1976). Menzioned earlier is Velasco's study (1969)
which investigated the lendinE criteria used by the Development Bank
of the Philippines. This is a good start but it is limited to a52
descriptive analysis of the lending rule used. We know so little
about other banking types. How, for instance do rumal banks Bllocate
their cPedit_ what caused the bankruptcy of a number of them; who are
their main depositors. Why do not they seem tobehave like commercial
banks?
There are other important financial institutions that have
not been studied: The Government Service Insurance System, the Social
Security System, and private insurance companies. The equity and bond
market !_as not been studied either. In this regard a model of
finance choice is needed. Internal sources, dimect bor_owinE, issue
of equities or bonds are alternative means of financing. What
determine the use of one om a combination of these soul_ces? To what
extent does market segmentation determine the financing choice of a
fimm? As we enumerated above, many fundamental questions in portfolio
choice and finance decisions have yet to be analyzed.53
5. Interest Rate
The literature on interest rate is somewhat dichotomized into
highly theoretical pieces on portfolio choice and interest in short-run
income and growth models, and, institutional analysis. Modern theory
of portfolio choice sprung from Keynes liquidity preference. Tobin
(1958, 1965) developed this into a rigorous theory of choice under
uncertainty. A very rich theoretical literature followed Tobin's
seminal work covering various models of interest rate expectation and
yield determination_ and the mope recent contributions on inter-temporal
decisions on saving/consumption, and portfolio. The latter are an
expansion of Fisher's investment theory and Friedman and others _
permanent income hypothesis in which saving and investment are decided
so as to maximize utility over time. It is logical to include portfolio
choice in the saving behavior since the yield on assets are expected
to influence savings level itself.
Ma?kowitz (1959) having worked along the same line as Tobin
extended his analysis to more than just two assets. The main criticism
of this approach is that individuals may not in fact maximizeutility
_om a utility function whose main components are tSe means and
variance of the rates of return of alternative portfolios, hence lacking
in generality (for instance Feldstein (1969)). Samuelson (1970)
referring back to an earlier article in 1967 stated that the Tobin-
Markowitz analysis is r_gorously applicable only where the statistical
distributions are normally Gaussian or where the utility-function to be54
maximized is quadratic. Nevertheless, where the risk is quite limited,
he concluded that the mean-variance analysis is a very good approximation.
The controversy however goes on and is a subject of continuing research
(for instance see Fishburn (1977)).
The structure of assets arises from the existence of risk
and uncertainty. In addition there is the effect of price changes on the
expected yield of the asset mone_, This effect has its origin in the
attempt to integrate monetary and value theory by Pakinkin (1956),
[
Metzler (1959) and others. Earlier, Marchak (1938) followin_ the works
of Hicks (1939) formulated a general model that treated the "joint"
supply and demand of money and assets to include consumption goods and
rheim prices. Implicit in this formulation is the use of utility
indifference among various possible income streams arising from
possible combination_of assets and consumption. A corresponding
structure of interest rate is implied in the model. Robinson (1951),
commenting along the same line noted that each type of asset is a
potential substitute for each other, and of money. This is the
theoretical basis for the issue cn substitutabil_ty or non-substitutabi-
lity Of money and near-monies. A sizable portion however of the
empirical works here are addressed to the issue raised by Gurley and
Shaw (1955, 1960) which revolves around the question of effectiveness of
monetar_y policy with the existence of near-monies or substitutes. A55
convenient survey is recently made here by Feige and Pearce (1977).
A related issue on demand fop money is, _at is the relevant Pate
of interest- the short or long-term rate of interest. Laidler (1969)
and Feige and Peamce (19.77) argue that if the holding of money is
viewed as a part of a general portfolio decision, then the Pate of return
on all alternative financial assets are relevant, and that money holdings
should be made to depend upon the entire spectrum of interest. The
structure of asset at specific points and hence the corresponding
structure of interest rates must have to be extended through time. This
is actually in consonance with the emerging large bodyof llteratuPe on
the ter_ structure of interest rates. Among the important works are
those of Culbemtson (1957), Meiselman (1962), Malkiel (1966), Nelson
(1972) and Dodds and Ford (1974).
The need to consider the term structure of interest rates
have made it more convenient Zo utilize a consumption-oriented theory of
demand for financial assets. This is the theory embedded in the rate of
timepreference and investment opportunity of Fisher. Stiglitz (1970)
noting that most of th_ works on the portfolio approach focuses on one-
period capital valuation which render the treatment of the ter_
structure of interest difficult, used this consumption-oriented theory
of demand for assets.56
It is to be noted that these portfolio-saving models were
wmitten for a very well developed and relatively perfect financial
market. Tn this market there is a lange and varied stock of alternative
assets that are fairly close substitutes for each other. Access to these
alternatives makes meaningful the application of such neat portfolio
choice constructs.
In the mac_o models of earlier vintage beginning with the
classical full-employment model, the interest rate is determined by
real flows - by the intersection of an upward sloping saving, an_ a
downward sloping investment function. Later models have interest rate
determined by both monetary and real factors.
In growth models it is shown that money and financial assets
must grow such that their yield is made equal to the steady growth rate
of saving and productivity of capital. This argument is based on port-
folio demand for both physical and financial assets. If the supply of
financial assets gmows too slowly, their yield would rise relative to
that on physical assets. Savems would demand more financial assets.
Investment will therefore be lower than that level required by steady
state condition.
These models are valuable for our general understanding of
interest rate. But they have limited applicability to economies57
characterized by serious market imperfections. Moreover, institutional
analysis like the theory of finance of Gurley amd Shaw, a_d Patrick's
financial nmrket sezmentation of the McKinnon and other development-
oriented models seem to be more useful in uaderstanding behavior of LDC
capital marker and development finance. These models, however, lack a
strong microformulation. The market for cmedit may develop from very
rudimentary stages of self-financing as described by McKinnon with
interpersonal lending-borrowing of Gurley and Shaw to a modern financial
system. In McKinnon, a structure of rates is generated from the optima
of time preference and rate of return to segmented indivisible invest-
ments. Interest rate to borrowers are expected _o be higher in undeveloped
compared to developed market. Costs of transaction and risks tend to be
higher where lenders are small and not specialized in intermediating
activity. Intermediation, as argued in section 2, results in greater
specialization of activities among enterpreneurs , wage workers and
intermediatDrs. The specialization leads to lower cost of funds to
borrowers and higher yield to savers. When investments are indivisible,
the specialization of investing activities among the more enterprising
individuals result in higher over all yield and interes_ rate. In the
pmocess of economic development, temporary segmentation is likely to be
experienced. The economy is expected to develop in a non-unifor_n
fashion. Some industrial sectors or areas lag behind others . The
financial market grows in the same fashion. Some parts of the economy58
may remain using self-finance and rudimentary lending-borrowing, while a
modern financial market operates in the industrial areas. In such a
segmented market, interest rate varies, with each segment generating its
own rate structure. Artificial segmentation arising from government
intervention similar to what was described above will produce additional
reason for interest rate variation.
The Philippine literature on interest rate may be considered
as " rudimentary as some of its markets. It is concerned with estimating
rates in certain segments of the market_ Some are mainly offshoot of
the debate on Central Bank policy _on credit and the complex regulations on
interest rates. No study has been done on the total structure of interest
rates and how it is determined. Data on interest rate movements within
segments of the financial market were obtained such as the interest
rates of various instruments in the money market (Clemente, 1975_ IMF
Mission 1977); Tan's (1974) comparison of a few alternative savings
forms such as savings andtime deposits, Treasury Bills and Bancom
Bills_ and the small surveys of effective lending rate undertaken by the
NEC-inter-agency team in 1971 and the Private Development Corporation
of the Philippines (PDCP) in 1972. In addition, a number of studies
estimated the lendin E rates charged by rural non-institutional creditors.
A study to describe and analyze the total interest rate structure
integmating past studies is badly needed. In this section_ we will put59
their empirical results as an attempt at integration.
A. The Interest Rate Structure
Any study of interest rate structure in the Philippines must
start with the Central Bank regulations. The Central Bank seems to
pursue a low interest rate policy but no clear statement has been made
to this effect. What it has clearly pursued is the development of special-
ized institutions by granting them credit incentives. Up to the mid 80s
interest rates on loans seemed to be below the Usury Law ceiling of 12
and 14 per cent _or secured and unseoured ioans_ The deposit rates,
rediscounting and government bond rates up to 1960 cannot be considered
to be below the market rate. The regulated rates became untenable from
the mid 60s to the present as demand for credit increased and inflation
rate rendered the regulated real rates negative. The Central Bank
responded to these events by a gradual upward adjustment in nominal rates
as seen in Table 4. The adjustments seem to be modest compromises to
disequilibrium in the market. The Central Bank response also took the
form of increasing the coverage of its regulaeion. The contrast is
best shown by comparing the extent of regulation during the Cuaderno era
and presently. In the first era, monetary control was mainly quantitative
th_ .... _ selective credit incentive was givcn to a few priority sectors.
These incentives might not have had a substantial impact as the market






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































list of interest rare regulations was made covering deposit, deposit
substitutes, other money market instruments and loans according to maturity.
In addition, there is a differential discount rates by institution and
activity.
Studies show that financial institutions innovated to take
advantage of the regulations or to evade them. From 1966_ deposit
substitutes and other money manket instruments began to be offered at
freely determined rates. Banks also clamored for the issuance of treasury
bills to replace oD supplemnt the long-term bonds whose rates were
becoming unattractive. Banking institutions allegedly evaded the Usury
Law ceiling. The small surveys of the National Economic Council (NEC,
1971) and the Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP,
1972) of some financial institutions showed that the effective rates
charged on loans were substantially higher than the legal ceiling. Tables
/
on interest rates from various studies are reproduced below in orde_ to
obtain a partial structure of interest rate. These are from the papers
of NEC (1971), Barrios (1973), Clemente (1975), WB (1976), IMF (1977)
and Vibal (1979). In 1971-72 when the Central Bank reported rates of
about 12-14 per cent for cemmercial banks, their effective rate was
between 14 and 29 per cent. Presently, commercial and other banks are
allowed by law to charge 19 per cent on long-term loans. Public or
publicly supported banks are allowed 2 per cent service fees which64
effectively raises the Usury Law ceiling f_om 14 to 16 per cent.
Borrowing from the money market is limited to a ceiling of 17 per cent,
35 per cent of which is collected as tax since 1978. The net nominal
yield to lenders is 11 per cent. This _ield is compared with the ceilings
on deposit rates in commercial and thrift banks of between 7.5 and 12
per cent.
The studies whenput together give us a partial structure of
interest rate in the regulated and unregulated parts of the market. The
structume obtained is quite peculiar. The real rate on many lending
instruments -- savings and time deposits, and government bonds are
oftentimes negative. Rates among s1_stitute instruments whether
borrowing or lending varied widely. The regulated rates are changed
at long intervals of time as seen in Table 4. They do not adjust to
price movement so when inflation rates rose in the 70s the real rate
declined to negative figures. On the other hand, the rate in the
unregulated market fluctuated widely above the legal rates. This
seEment was relatively small making it more vulnerable to general
movements in money supply and reserve positions of banks. Clemente's
(1975) and Roxas' (1977) studies show that the market is very sensitive
to movements in relative rates of competing instruments. The leading
rate in the money market seems to be the interbank call loan rate. This
in turn is determined by the reserve position of banks. Unfortunately,65
Clemente's money market rate function did not use reserve pasition as an
argument in h_interest rate function. She used money supply instead.
Roxas did not give the basis of his conclusion in the cross-elasticity
of interest rates of competing instruments - the money market. Dompor
and Cruz (1979) give the following results o9 thei_ money market study.
Quarterly data on weighted average interest rates were •taken f_om.the
Central Bank Statistical Bulletin and Banoom Development Corporation
• .... •:' •• 2 !
Reports. Their result may be compared to Clemente's equation given in !
Section 4.
Dompor and Cruz have the following regression _esulT:
MMR = 22.462 - .195 CPI - .23 ER R2= .70
(3.074) (-2.89)
where
MMR : average interest on money market instruments
MS = money supply
SPI = stock price index (Manila)
CPI = consumer price index (Manila)
ER = excess reserves66
Table5
List of Bonds Issued
Thei_ Maturities and Interest Rate
1965 - 1970
Bond Issue Maturity in Years Interest Rate
PW % ED Bonds 30 4 I
NPC Bonds 30 4 - 5 3/2
NAWASA Bonds 40 4 5 "/2
ACCFA Notes 2 2
,, ,' 5 2
" " 5 3
,, ', 2 3
" " 5 3
T_easury Notes 5 2
" " 3 5
R.P. External loan Bond 6 1/2
NIA (National Irrigation Adm. )
Treasury Notes 5 5
" " 4 5 1/2
" " 4 6
Certificate of Indebtedness I I/2 2
PW _ ED Bonds 7
NAWASA Bonds 7 1/2
NPC Bonds (non-supported) 7
NAWASA 7 1/4
R.P. Replacement Bonds 2
I! If I! 4
NIA Bonds 8
Land Bank Capital Bonds 7 _ •
Tmeasury Notes 5 l0 3/4
" " 5 11 /4
Source: ,Annual Reports_ Securities Ma#ket Depar%ment,
Central Bank of the Philippines. '_67
Table 6
End of the Month Average Yield on Treasury Bills
ahd Bancom Bills, 1966-1970
End of the T R £ A S U R Y B I L L S

















5 6*4 .7 i0,9
6 6.9 .8 12,6
7 6.8 7.2 12.4
8 6.5 7.7 11.3
9 6.1 7.2 11.0
I0 6.2 7.3 11.4
11 6.5 7.8 11.7
12 6.4 7.8 11.7




5 6.1 7.5 13.7
6 6.4 8.9 13.6
7 6.1 8.3 13_9
8 6.9 8.2 13,9
9 6.2 8._ 14, _
10 6.6 7.5 13,9
11 13i
12 6.7 7,3 13:i860
Table 6 page 2
k959 1 8.9 7.6 13.2
2 7.0 7.6 13.9
3 7.6 7.1 13.9
4 7.4 7.7 14.3
5 7.6 7.6 13.9
6 7.7 11.3 14.8
7 7.1 11.4 14.9
8 7.6 11.5 14.6
9 8.8 11.3 13.6
10 8.3 11.0 9.6 12.9
11 8.2 11.2 8.9 12.2
12 8.1 6.9 7.9 12.5
1970 1 6.6 8.4 8.7 11.6
2 7.6 9.1 9.1 12.7
3 9.9 11.8 12.6 12.9 14.0
4 12.0 13.1 13.6 13.8 14.4
5 13.0 13.3 13.9 14.6 15.2
6 14.1 14.2 14.9 15.7 16.2
7 14.9 15.6 16.4 16.7 16.2
8 13.6 13.2 14.4 14.8
9 10.2 11.2 11.8 11.9 15.9
10 10.5 11.2 12.8 12.7 15,8
11 12.5 13.2 13.7 14.4 15.8
12 12.9 !4.@ 14.7 14.8 15.7
Source_ Tan, E. A. "Couduct of Honetary Po!ipy and the Quant_taliVd
"\ Cont_ol of C:_edit." Quezon C_y: university of the
PhilippineS_ School of EconomicS-lnstitute of ECOnomic
Deveiopm_nt and Research (UPSE'IEDR) DiscUssion Paper
NO. 73-8, 1973.69
Table 7
Comparative Money Market Intemest Rates
Interbank 91-Day Prime
Call-Loan Treasury Bills Comercial
Rates (Primary Market) Papers
1971
Januar7 6.50 13.60 11.44
Februamy 11.50 12.91 11.62
March 9.25 12.64 9.00
April 7.00 10.37 10.12
May 13.12 11.55 13.00
June 12.25 12.31 13.12
July 13.25 11.55 12.50
August 10.50 11.58 14.25
September 13.00 11.73 13.38
October 14.00 11.60 14.00
November 18.00 12.26 15.75
December 13.50 11.07 14.00
1972
January 8.25 11.62 10.12
February 8.25 11.12 10.00
March 9.75 11.06 13.25
April 13.50 10.97 13.62
May 19.00 11.70 19.88
June 14.50 12.36 19.20
July 15.75 12.73 15.00
August 20.00 12.66 19.50
September 10.50 12.61 10.75
October 13.50 12.59 16.00
November 14.50 12.04 10.50
December 9.25 i1.66 14.00
1973
January 8.50 11.31 12.00
Februamy 7.2.5 10.61 9,00
March 7.00 9.94 9.25
Apr_l 8.75 9.99 11.75
May 7.75 10.16 9.:64
June 3.75 9.:67 7.62
Ju_y 3,7_ 10.03 7,00
"Au_st 4.7 5, 9,.43 7,_ 12:
September 3.25 7.84 6.50
October 8_00 5..92 7.50
NoVember 9...00 8,19 8.,62
Dee.em:be_ 12.00 9.74 14,007Q
Table 7 Dage 2
1974
January 13.63 10.06 14.36
Febmuamy 10.26 10.03 16.66
March 14.38 9.90 14.75
April 12.85 10.12 14.73
May 17.97 10.42 16.05
June 15.40 10.12 16.71
July 11.13 10.09 14.50
August 12.99 9.96 15.71
Septembe_ 12.14 10.14 16.02
October 13.05 9.76 16.19
NovembeP 17.78 9.98 17.10
December 16.53 10.03 20.84
Notes: Intembank and commercial paper rates for 1971-1873 are
averages of high and low quotations; 1974 rates ame
weighted averages.
Source: Clemente, I. "A Study of _he Money Market in the Philippine:
1975, U.P.S.E,, Table 13_ pp. 79-82.71
Table 8
Statutory Rates Effective Rates
Percent Per Annum Percent PeP Annum
Commercial banks 9.14 12.18-16.78
Rumal banks 12-14 15-18
Development banks 12 15
Investment banks 9-12 13-15
Government financed
institutions 9-12 14-15
Insurance firms 12-14 28-32
Consumer finance 12-14 45-60
Unregulated markets 12-14 60-400
Commercial paper e 9.75-11.75
Government secumities _
Short-term bills 10-14 16-18
Medium-ter_ notes 7-10
Long-te1_m bonds 7
Soumce: NEC, Philippine. Report of the Inter-Agency Committee on
the Study of Interest Rates_ Table I. p. 17.
*If the paper or bond is sold at less than par val:ue, the
effective rate will be higher than the stated rates. For example
a bond with par value of _I00 and stated rate of 10% if sold at
say _90 will have an effective ra'te of _I0 = 11.19,
_907_
Table 9
1972 Effective Lending Rates for Secured Loans
of 5 Financial institutions, in %
Institution Effective Rate Charged
A 28.80% p.a.
B 24.28% p.a.
C 17.929 - 28.80% p.a
D 13.63
D 13.409 p.a.
E 13.63% - 13.66% p.a
Weighted Average 26.70% or 27%
Source: Barrios, Victor S. '_The Evolution of Philippine Interest
Rate Policy_ Table II, p. 71.'73
B. Effect of Interest Rate Regulations on Credit Allocation and Saving
Behavior
Theoretically_ intez.est rate influences saving behavior. The
significance of the effect and its sign however depends on the relative
strength of income and substitutio_between present and future consumption.
2
The empirical evidence of _interest rate-savin_ relation has been generally
unclear.
Taking into account an apparent successful high interest
policy adopted in Taiwan and Korea in the late 1950s and the 1960s
respectively, Sicat (1969) pointed out that these experiences may be
taken as a lesson for a possible change in the Philippine interest rate
policy. There was a drastic increase in financial savings_n Korea in
response to the large increase in the ceiling rate to 30 per cent. In
the Philippines the ?apid growth in deposit substitute can be reasonably
interpreted as a response to the relatively high rates on this issue.
This segment also grew rapidly in the past ten years in Thailand which
has a similar repressive interest rate policy as the Philippines. in
contrast it showed slow growth in high interest rate countries such as
Korea and Taiwan (Khatkate and Villanueva, 1978). They have a_ implicit
suggestion to raise the rate Paid on both time and savings deposit.
In a comparative study of saving behavior in Asianzcountries,
Williamson (1975) concluded that higher interest rates are associated_74
with lower real saving. He suggested an explanation based on the
observation that saving and investment decisions are highly interdependent
in the Asian household sector. He further noted that interest rates
appear to influence the short-run saving decision more than the long-
run decision, This interdependence of household saving and investment
decisions was also noted by Hool_y and Moreno(ig76)in their study of
financial flows in the Philippines:
"We take the position that the Sharp bifurcation
between produding and consuming a6tivities does not reflect
reality in the Philippine society where households often
engage in array of productive activities from farming to
small commercial handicraft activities... In the traditional
household, consumption and pmoduction decisions ame inter-
dependent and saving and investment activities ape best
viewed f-_om the stand-point of total portfoli6napp_oaeh,
which considers the assets (and equity) of the households
as the pivot of the households total wealth accumulation
activities."
Rene Encarnaci6n (1979) further took issue with the ILO
Report and empirically investigated for Korea the contention that an
increase in interest rates leads to higher levels of saving and
investment. In a numbe? of regressio_ of saving on interest rates,
income and other variables, the income variable coefficient was found
to be consistently highly significant. The interest rate variable
coefficient on the other hand was _enerally insignificant (p. 16). He
fu_the_ noted that the interest Pate reform in Korea cannot be taken
in isolation because it was merely one element in a broad package of75
policies. He suggested that despite the high nominal rates adopted
during the start of the reform, sizeable loans were given at preferential
rates. Moreover, a large inflow of cheap credit from foreign sources
was evident, He further observed the high growth of theKorean economy
when it launched its first economic develo_ent plan in 1962. He argued
_hat , all the above forces have contributed to the _owth of savings.
, Mejia (1979) in a rico-Keynesian growth model framework analyzed
i
the influence of the Philippine financial system on four key _wth
parameters. They are: the saving rate, capital-labor ratio, labor pro-
ductivity and the growth rate of income. She used a three-equation,
model consisting of a saving, interest rate (both nominal and real), and
a capital-labor ratio functions. Private saving was fitted on a two-stage
regression function using the predicted value of interest rate as
explanatory variables. Interest rate was a function of money supply.
Income and_zhe expected rate of inglatlon were calculated through an
adaptive expectation model. The nominal interest rate used was a
weighted average of interest rate on loan _anted by commmercial and
savings banks. Specially transacted loans at the rate below 4.5 per
cent were excluded tO minimize a downward bias in the interest rate.
Central Bank data on nominal interest rate and money supply were used.
The National Income Account of the National Development Authority (NDA)
was the source of income and saving data. For income, gross domestic76
product in constant 1972 prices was used. Income less direct and
indirect taxes, plus transfer payment gave estimatiS of the disposable
income. Total private savings composed of household and corporate
savings was deflated by the GNP implieit price index (1972=100). She
found a negativeand significant correlation between saving and the
nominal rate of interest. When the real rate of interest was used, the
coefficient was negative and insignificant. The income coefficient was
consistently positive and highly significant.
This b_ief inquiry into the saving-interest relation indicates
t
a p_eponderance of evidences suggesting a weak relationship between
these two economic variables. The clearer,and to the writers'
opinion, the more important#_relationship to be expected is interest
rate and the institutionalization of saving through their placement in
financial assets.
Emery (1970) in a comparative study of Southeast Asian
financial institutions observed that the mobilization of savings appears
to have been discouraged by the relatively low ceilings on deposit rates.
It was likewise noted that the Philippines was unable to mobilize its
full potential in the mobilization of capital funds (pp.384_ 480). Tan
(1974, 1976) stressed that the unattractive rates on saving and time
deposits, the most familiar financial saving instruments discourage
i ntermediation and reduce the flow of funds to banks, especially rural77
and development banks. As already pointed out in other sectors pesging
these rates at low levels discriminates against low-income household
having no access to the more sophisticated money market instruments. We
may repeat here the arguments against below market rate loan ceil_ng. It
is very likely, considering the culture of/the Philippines that credit is
rationed based on persona], rather than economic criteria (Tan, 197q).
Borrowers would Tend to go first to public and publicly supported
private institutions charging the regulated rates. As more loan
applications are submitted to these banks, processing cost per application
approved increases since more papers are processed. The red tape delays
follow-ups of loan applications making it more costly to borrowers
from distant places. The cost per peso of loans therefore rises for the
smaller loan. Furthermore, these banks follow the banking practice
requiring relatively riskless collateral , mostly real estate, for loans.
These facts lead to the discrimination _n cost and availability of
credit aginst small distant borrowers (NEC !971, IL0 1974, Tan 1974, Velasco 1969,
Cruz 1975). On the other hand, the regulated market where the going
rate can be almost double that of the regulated sector seems to cater to
a special set of clients ~ the large businesses in the cities. The
unregulated credit instruments for instance available in Metro Manila
financial institutions are not accessible to the average borrowers.
Though there seems to be a concensus that the allocation of78
low-cost credit is inequitable, very little empirical evidence supports
the conclusions. Vibal p?esented the loan size distribution of DBP loans
showing that less than 10 per cent of total loans went to the loans of
less than _5_000. He also found that until 1970_ the bulk of PNB loans
went to the sugar industry mostly for milling and refining equipment (up
to 90 per cent until 1970). The loan doss not definitely go to the
wage-farmers in the sugar industry. Studies are being conducted on the
allocation of rural bank credit. Rural banks have not in general,
attracted savings deposit. Instead they relied on the Central Bank
discount window as a regular source of funds. Repayment rates in these
banks were found rather low.
An added complication to credit rationing is the possible
variation in transaction cost. An attempt to estimate transactions cost
in lending was made by Salto and Villanueva (1978). Their work follows
from a novel view of transactions cost as capturing not just the administma-
tire cost of processing loans but of the risk of default by the borrower.
The larger the risk, the greater must be the resources put to be able to
collect adequate information. It must be pointed out that certain risks
to the lender cannot be reduced to zero by adequate information. There
may be inherent uncertainty about the outcome of a project o_ any
activity. Such risks cannot therefore be reflected <n transactions
cost. Nevertheless their findings are as expected. Transaction cost is79
higher the smaller the loan. Transaction cost is found to range from
1.8 for large scale to 7.3 for small loans._ Also of great
int'erest i . , s '-. their observation that there is
significant variation in transaction cost amon_ financial intermediaries
that cannot be explained by their size. They compared transactions cos_ of
administration and default risk for small and large loans issued by rural
:banks; private development bank_,the Development Bank of the Philippines,
the Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (an ,investment
bank) and commercial banks, Transaction cost is from 5 to 7 per cent
for small loans, a fairly high cost to be added into the interest rate
on loans. The study pointed to the serious implication of this for the
development of small scale activities.
The paradoxical nature of the pattern of development of the
financial market may be discussed to close this section. It grew
rapidly but it also assumed artificial segmentation within and among
institutions. The modern sector has usually a well developed financial
system where savers are able to hold their wealth in alternative finan-
cial assets. The rural and informal urban sectors on the other hand still
save in the form of physical assets and currency hoarding oF borrow from
The writers are as yet unable to obtain permission to quote
the paper and so refrain from giving more detailed review of its
interesting results.8O
individuals. The policy to spread banking offices in zhe countryside,
resulted in an increase in finanelal assets relative to total transactions
(GNP) or investment as shown by Hooley and Moreno (IS76). In fact,
i_e finance ratio in the Philippines is not too different from that of the
U.S. and Japan. Their study also obtained direct evidence-on the increase
in household financial asset holdings. Studies on rural credit show that
increasingly more credit for rice production was obtained from financial
institutions. In farms_ however, only a small part of saving (about 2.5
per cent) was placed in financial assets5 the rest in physlcal. Most
savings and investment book place simultaneously in the form of livestock
and equipment (TBAC-BRF 1979). Despite this encouraging picture the
growth rate of the financial system as a whole is not very satisfactory.
Artificial segmentation develcped as a consequence of detailed regulations
particularly those on interest rate and discounting.81
6. Money Supply Function
The literature on money supply functions have long been
expanded from the text-book principle of simple reserve multiplier to
_odels which include demand for credit by spending units and portfolio
choice of banks (Meigs, 1962_ Dewald_ 1963). The observed stock of money,
or money supply is the result of the interplay of supply and demand for
credit in the commercial banking system. In order to appreciate the
development of the litemature_ the si_le reserve multiplier is given
and revisions of the supply function are shown "tobe relaxation of the
assumptions implicit in the multiplier principle.
The reserve multiplier principle applies in a system of
managed currency based on fractional reserves. Assume there is a
reserve requirement_ rr_ on demand deposits, DD, 0 < rr < I. This
means a commercial bank is allowed to lend ( 1 - rr) of its demand
deposits. Under the assumptions that a) banks keep zero excess
reserves; b) they lend the maximum allowed; and c) the borrowers redepo-
sit the total loan proceeds, banks ePeate money to the extent of -_. rr
of its reserves. The maximum loan/deposits, DD_ that banks can
Assume an initial deposit of D_. Banks /.end (l-mr) DO. When
its loan is redeposited we get AD = (l-rr_D 0 which again is lent and
redeposited . Thus the initial deposit of D O generates Amoney
• DO
supply - (rr) "•82
maintain is DD = I-_--R. Its reserves, R is equal to rmDD and rr
i
isthe multiplier. R is the monetary base consisting of currency rr
and primary reserves (deposits with the CB and cash in vault).
Tobin (1967) was one of the first to question the extent of
money creating power of commercial banks. He argued that how much
banks lend (and therefore the credit created out of a given level of
reserves) depends on variabiesdetermining demand for funds by spending
units. Interest rate and level of economic activity, among others, enter
in the demand function.
Works on portfolio behavior of banks argue that the ability
of banks to expand credit is beyond _hat warranted by available primary
reserves. Or that banks may lend less than this so that they instead
keep excess reserves. Banks keep secondary reserves of highly liquid
assets - treasury bills and other prime papers. Moreover they can
borrow from their CB in tight credit situation or as a move to achieve
an optimal portfolio. How much of each reserve asset is held depends on
their relative rates. How much they lend alsodepends on loan rate
relative to the rates on these assets. A fairly large literature
developed in the West especially since the 60s on portfolio behavior of
banks including on reserve portfolio. These have direct implication on
money supply. A number of papers have excess reserve functions, some
look • at portfolio adjustments by banks in tight and easy situation.83
A related question that generated some of the models was the effectiveness
of monetary policy when banks are able to tap secondary reserves.
Finally, Brunner (1964) pointed to possible leakages in the
lending-redeposit process. The greater the proportion of loans not
redeposited, thesmaller the reserve multiplier. This argument particular-
ly relevant in LDC situation where the demand deposi_ habit is not
widesprea d. Observed supply of money is thus the result of lending,
redepositing and portfolio behavior of the different decision units
involved in the intemmediation process. Countries may differ in
deposit habits and in central bank regulations determining allowable
forqns of reserves_ their relative cost and those restricting intermedia-
Tion. Restrictive regulations are found To be common in not a few
LDCs (McKinnon9 1973, Bhatia and Khatkate_ 1975). Restriction on
lending rates as we have seen_ gives rXse to excess demand fop loans.
In such a case money supply function becomes mainly determined by supply
of funds.
The literature on Philippine money supply applies some of the
basic elements of the above models. The studies_ however,, suffer from
inadequate model specification particularly of the Pole of interest rate.
Part of the reason is that this has not been accurately measured.
Because of the legal ceiling on loan and deposit r_ates_ no accurate
reporting of these variables has been done. The reported rates were84
thus found not very useful and not to give inconclusive results. In this
review we started with trend analysis.
Money supply was allowed to grDw at fairly high rates with
some years exhibiting growth rates as high as 20 per cent. Money move-
ment from external origin composed a very large portion of total move-
ment. Of the money supply coming from domestic sources, credit to the
public sector assumed a large proportion. Zialcita (1970) traced The
movement from _949 to1969 and decomposed it by origin. He found t_iaZ
until 1953 The external sector through surpluses in the balance of pay-
ments contributed to the growth of money supply. The public sector
contributed irregularly to the increases. Its contribution was not
predominant in the beginning, The relative contribution of these sectors
shifted after 1955-57. The external sector suffered from negative
balances, thus drawing the pesos out of the country. Central bank
credit to the government assumed a dominant and increasing role in the
upward movement especially from the mid 60s. In the 70s it contributed
a larger portion of the increases in money supply than the two other
sources. Zialcita's table is reproduced below.
Subsequent works by Encarnaci6n and Castro,(1972) and Tan
(IB74) developed money supply functions suited to The Philippine
setting. Without explaining in detail the hypothesis tested Encarnaci6n
and Castro built an econometric model of money supply consisting of the85
Table 10
Factors Responsible for Movement in Money of
Internal Origin, 1950-1969
(Percentage Distribution.)
Item 1950-53 1954-57 1958-61 1962-65 1966-69
Money of Internal Origin 100.0 I00.0 i00.0 I00.0 100.0
A. By end-user
i. Government 49.2 58.1 47.2 38.9 56.9
a. National 36.3 34.6 21.2 13.9 13.0
b, Local 12.9 23.5 26.0 25.0 43.9
2. Private Sector 50.8 41.9 52.8 61.1 43.1
B. By source
1. Central Bank 53.0 59.3 52.5 50.9 47.8
2. CommeTcial Banking
System 47.0 40.7 47.5 49.1 52.2
Source: Zialcita, E. P. UMoney Supply Movements in the Philippines_ _EJ,
2nd Semester, Vol. IX, No. 2_ p. 190.86
following five (5) structural equations and one (1) identity (pp. 215-
217).
1. Zb = 288.90 + 0.3862 Lcb_l + 0.3837 Bg-1 + 0.3657 F 1
(2.83) (11.39) •(3.03)
_2 = .987, s = 73.46, D.W. = 1.536
2. Z = 1004.39 + 1.4284 Zb - 70.200 R m
i64.57) (-8._6
_2 = .995, s = 62.96, DoW. : 1.554
Z = 1038.13 + 1.3756 Zb - 70.564 Rr
(53.39) (-7.30)
3. Z : 122.03 + 0.4127 Z
C m
(70.07)
_2 = .996_ s = 24.17_ D.W. = 1.595
a
Lbp - 246.231 R + 416.439 Rb 4. = 333.90 + 5.679_ Za r
(6.04) (-3.53) (2.42)
_2 = .980, s = 301.87, D.W. = 1.117
a
5. Lcb= -953.784 - 32._4540 Rd + 68.5993 Rr + 0.2116 Lbp
(-2.33) (-2,33) (6.51) (15.21)
_2 = .996, s = 77.60, D.W. = 1.402 (1952-69)
6. Z : Zb - Z a c87
Z = currency in circulation, average of end-of-month
c figures over the year.
F = International reserve,
Z = stock of money_ equal to Z plus private demand m e
deposits.
Zb = monetary base, equal to Zc plus Za.
Z = available reserves of the commercial banking system,
a
average of beginning and end of year figures.
B = internal debt outstanding of the government, end
g of the year.
R = ratio of required reserves to total deposits in the r
commercial banking system, average of beginning and
end of year figures, in percentage units.
R d = Central Bank rediscount rate, average over the year,
in percentage units.
1
= weighted average of interest rates charged by banks,
in percentage units. _
a
Lbp = private domestic credits of the commercial banking
a system, average of beginning and end of year figures.
= Central Bank loans and advances to the commercial
Lob
banking system, average of beginning and end or year figur ....
Following traditional funcZions_ money supply is deter_nined
by the monetary base consisting of available reserves and reserve
requirement. But monetary base, Zb, is determined by foreign reserves_
F, and CB c_edit to commercial banks_ Lcb, and the government debt,,
B . The authors did not explain why the variable, B , was used in
g g
the monetary base equation. Their reason was probably because most
government issues are bought by the Central Bank or by commercial banks
to be part of their primary reserves. This transaclion amounts to an88
imdirect_ending of CB to the government since reserves deposits of
banks are used to buy government issues, _e expansionary impact of
government security purchases by financial intermediaries depend on
the proportion that can be used as primazyreserves. Banks Would tend
to hold the maximum allowed as primary reserves given that the yield on
alternative reserve assets is zero. The ]eve] of outstanding debts
appmoximates therefore the amount of Central Bank lending to the
government.
The monetary base equation shows the almost equal influence
of government and commercial bank borrowing from the Central Bank in
expanding money supply. This is to be expected since Central Bank
loan to banks and to the government will have the same expansionary
impact on money supply. The discounting equation Lcb cannot be taken
conclusively yet, Alternative hypotheses and specifications for
discounting need to be developed and tested tO capture more fully the
way this window is used in the Philippines. The discount window has
been used as a regular source of funds by both public banking institu-
tions and private commercial banks. The amount banks can borrow depends
on what discounting/loans ratko is allowed by the Central Bank. A
schedule of such ratios is used for various activities _anked in terms
or generosity. This in turn depends on the priority of the period.
The discount rate also varies with the priority given. Nevertheless,89
the window is a generous and cheap source of funds for the three public
or semi-public banks and the private commercial banks. The margin bet-
ween loan and discount rates even for non-priority loans has been very
large. Cumrently legal loan mate ranges from 14 per cent to about 20
per cent, depending on security and maturity. Rediscount rate ranges
from 4.5 per cent for priority loans in rural and other government
banks to 8.0 per cent for regu!am commercial loans. The highest rate
still gives a wide margin to loan rates. For these reasons Tan (1@74)
questioned whether it was meaningful to hypothesize a function such as
equation (5). An alternative is to simply take CB loans to banks as
an exogenous variable like loans to the government, The assumption
here is that banks tend to borrow to the limit allowed. And, such
borrowing is not sensitive to the loan and discount rates. She posits
the function g_ven below and tested it on two Sets of quarterly data:
1953 to 1960 and 1961 to 1970. The breaking up of the series was done
to see whether a change in the coefficients is evident as monetary
policy became mote lax on govemnment borrowing. She obtained the
following:
1. (1953-1960)
M = 14.4 + .199 R + .011 B + .704 RL
(3.302) (.109) g (.173)RD
R2 = .3092
where r is the relative rates of various assets and x are OTher
variables that determine bank lending and secondary sources of funds.
Money supply basically depends on available reserves and currency Zb,
and how much lending and borrowing the system transact given the
monetary base and reserve requirement. Bank liability includes the
deposits of government funds, these bein$ determined by government
debts, B . Foreign reserves are also part of bank liability. The g
equation therefore includes redundant independent variables or at least
strongly interdependent ones.
Without building a model of the money supply _eneration
process they posited a reserve multiplier equation
Z = f (A, c, t, z)
where c is the ratio of currency to demand deposits, t is the ratio
of time deposits to demand deposits, and x is my interpretation of
other parameters they mentioned as indicating other leakages from the
loans-demand deposits process. Both equations were tested on each of
the 10 Asian countries including Japan and Burma. The significant
variables differed as expected, and so with the value, of the coefficients.
For the Philippines, they found




(The values in the parentheses are the standard errors,)
It is interesting to see that the quarterly results differed
from those of the annual. It is hard to believe 'that neither foreign
reserves or government debts is an insignificant explanatory variable
of money supply. This contrasts with Encarnaci6n/Castro's model, The
multiplier equation fo_ the Philippines gives bette_ results.
Z = 1530 + .929 A - _$.195 c + 3.45 t
(.106) (2.780) (.923)
R2 = .968
All the coefficients are significant and of the right sign --
positive for the reserve level A, negative for c and positive for
t. Ordinarily, the coefficient for time deposit/demand deposit ratio
is expected to be negative. In a developing financial system, however,
the increase in time deposits relative to total money supply (and
therefore to demand deposits) may indicate the institutionalization of
savings. This tends to contribute to the total loanable funds of banks
instead of weakening of the multiplier. The results of the two equations
tested are more consistent with those of Tan's work. The comparison of
resultsamong countries did not give a thorough explanation why the94
countries behaved differently.
We may conclude this section by pointing to the pmoblems of
specification m_d measumemeht of interest rates found in the supply
functions developed and tested in the Philippiens. Future work should
consider stock adjustment so thet the short-run and long-run impact of
exogenousvariable is distinguished. This might clarify the seemingly
conflicting results from quarterly and annual semies.g5
7. Inflation
Several studies have identified a number of factors affecting
post-war price movements in the Philippines. Depending on the period
covered and theoretical framework used, some factors were seen to have
exerted a stronger influence than others on the rate of inflation,
Though most of the studies considered the demand pull thmough monetary
expansion, they placed greater weight on shifts in domestic supply
of goods, particularly food, in explaining inflation. Cost push
factors were not deemed relevant here except for the cost push in
imported factors resulting from devaluation, and the oil crisis in 1973
and later years. Otherwise wage increases were determined_ with a lag_
by inflation rate_ The studies might be grouped into those explaining
long-run trends in prices and those• explaining big spurts in prices
such as the 1964-,65 and the 1973-75 inflation. In explaining the
long-run movement of general price level, the authors used a
quantity theory framework wherein price changes are taken to be a
function of changes in demand and output. In the studies of specific
inflationary experiences a structural approach was used. The inflation
rate is decomposed to find out which groups of items contributed most
to inflation. The causes of the price increase in the major components
contributing to inflation were then traced to shifts in demand or inl :_
supply affecting the sector.96
It is useful %o note that p?ice movements since the immediate
post-wam period is somewhat J-shaped as shown in Table II below.
Table 11
Consumer Price Index and Money Supply Index
1949-1978 (1972=100)





























1977 200.4 203.18 (as of June,
1977)
1978 216.4 (as of August, 1978)
Source: CentralAStatistica I Bulletin97
The consumer price index in 1945 was almost 10 times the 1938 level.
Then prices started declining as domestic supply of cons_,er goods,
lap, ely from imports increased. This downward Trend continued up to
The mid 50s_ then it gradually moved up. An acceleration of The Pate
from the mid 60s to The present is evident. The Consumer price index
Pose by 23 per cent between 1965 and 1969_ by 60 per cent from 1959 to
1973, and thmn by 72 per cent between 1973 and 1977. The index Pose
at less than half the 1965-78 rate in the first two decades after
independence especially duping the Cuaderno era.
A. Food Price Changes and Other Causes of Inflationary Spurts
Treadgold (1969) was one of the first to write on
Philippine inflation. He was not satisfied with the aggregate nature
of either quantity of Keynesian theory in explaining price behavior.
He pointed out that food price movements accounted fop a large part
of over-all price level movements. And, a broad positive association
existed between movements in the absolute and relative price of food
and movements in the over-all price level. He used a structuralisT
framework arguing that even in the absence of general excess demand,
inflation may occur if the processes of economic and population _owth
ape such as to cause the demand for food to rise more rapidly than
supply. The same a_gument was used to explain The fall in price from
1950 to 1955. Food supply was observed To increase more rapidly than98
demand.
Treadgold placed an important role on farm response to
_he relative prices of domestically consumed and exports goods to
explain the pre-1955 price decline and the 1955-1965 inflation. For
the pre-1955 price decline, he noted that the shifts in relative
prices resulting from the inflation after the war accelerated The
recovery in food production. The 1946 absolute food prices wer_
between five and sLx times higher than in 19_I. Export prices on the
other hand, weme only t_hr_e to four times hi_her than in 19_I. He
a_Eued these price signals directed agricultural production towards
domestic food crops (p. 184).
Fom The 1955-1965 period , food supply lagged behind growing
demand. Despite the fact that food prices rose absolutely and relatively
to the prices of non-agricultural non-food products, it did not rise
relative to the price of export crops. Consequently, food supply did
not grow fast enough. Other reasons Were cited: slow rate of Technical
progress in the agricultural sector; increasing scarcityanddim_nish_ng
quality of land; additional U.S. sugar quota and the agricultural land
reform bill of 1963 which produced uncertainty over ownership of agri.
cultural land. Its effect was expected to be worse on domestic food
production.
Earlier_ Cluni_s-Ross (1966) also studied The 1962-6499
inflation. He focused on the extremely large and almost exclusive
contribution of food price increases to the total rise in the price
index -- 25.4 of the total 29.1 points rise. A remarkably low increase
in the prices of non-food items was observed. According to Clunies-
Ross the fast growth of output in manufacturing, transportation and
construction accounted for this. He argued, however, that the rapid
rise in food prices could not be due only to supply factors. Indeed,
• demand increased as a consequence of the rise in money income of
exportems following the devaluation. There was some debate on the
accuracy of upward and adjustment of industrial production Ross made
to explain the slow price movement in this sector. Nevertheless, growth
rate of non'agricultural output was about twice that of food even
without Clunies-Ross' adjustments.
Following Treadgold's appmoach in his study of the 1960
inflation, Bautista first decomposed the rise in consumer price index
int6'major components: food c,fothing, housing, and iight and water
and miscellaneous items. His table is reproduced below.
In all three periods, food price increases contributed more
than half of the total increase of ,the Consumer price index. Focusing
on the IS72-74 inflation he pointed out four causes: bad weather,
devaluation, oil crisis_ and increase in money supply. The weather
duming this period was exceptionally bad. The floods brought by
Typhoon Yoling did not only destroy producible farm capital but alsoi00
Table i_
DECOMPOSING THE CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION
No. of points rise, Percentage
CPI fo_ Manila Contribution
1955-1969




Fuel, light and watel 28.4 2.5
Miscellaneous 26.5 1.6.7
1969-1973




Fuel, liKht and water 76.1 4.0
Miscellaneous 48.7 18.4
1973-1974




Fuel, light and water 176.9 10.3
Miscellaneous 49.3 20.5
Source; Bautista, Romeo, "Inflation in the Philippines" in
J. Encarnaci6n, et al., Phi iipp_neEconomic P_oblemsin
Perspective, University of _he Philippines School Of_
Economics, Quezon City, I@76.IDI
silt the soil in Central Luzon. The recovery was therefore slow.
Besides, 1972 to early 1973 was also a good period in the world market
for primary p_oducts. Prices of sugar, copra and rice weme abnormally
high. Furthermore the peso was devalued in early 1970 by almost 50 per
cent. Consequently output was probably drawn into exports t_us reducing
further domestic supply. Money supply from externalorigln increased
and no compensatory reduction from other sources was undertaken. In
late 1973 the oil price was doubled, and redoubled in The early part of
197_.
.The analysis of these fac%ers was somewhaTuneven. Bautls_a
gave the supply side a lot of weight. Nevertheless no empirical evidence
was provided To show changes in domestic supply of goods, especially
resulting from The bad weather and following the devaluation and
world shortages. In analyzing thepossible impact of increases in
demand, he compared growth rates of prices and money supply over 5-yeam
intervals from 1955-60 %o 1969-73. He found no clea_ positive _elation
in the gmowTh rates. The effect of money supply incPeases on prices
cannot be made yet on the basis of the data and method used. The author
focused on estimating the impact of the oil price hike on the cost of
production using the 1969 input-output table. The study estimated
an impact of about 22 percentage points in the rise in the consumer p_ice
index. This means a contPibution of about two-thirds of the 35 per
cent rise in the CPI 1973-7_. Using The same input-output TecHnique as102
Bautista's,Mijares (1971) estimated the effect of the 1970 devaluation
on the CPI to be as much as 12 per cent.
It is to be noted that the 1969-74 inflation was caused
by a rare coincidence of several factors: bad weather, devaluation and
the oil crisis. At the same time money supply was allowed to grow very
rapidly. Ohly extreme pessimists will expect the same occurrence. In
fact_ the past months' experience already indic_utes that enly0PEC's
new price is causing the 1979 inflationary pressure. The weather
has been kind and the_e is an excess supply of rice. And unlike in
1973-75, th_ Central Bank is following a tight credit policy. Yet the
inflation rate observed as of the writing of this ;paper is 21 per
cent.
B. Long-Run Price Movement
Some of the studies of loDg-run price behavior were part of
the structural analysis of particular inflationary experience. Clunies-
Ross (1966) and Treadgold (1969) both included in their work an inves-
tigation of the price trend. Later Encarnaci6n et. al. (1972) and
Tan (1974) fitted their own price functions.
The price equation of Enearnaei6n eto al. was part of their
macro model of the Philippines on 1950 to 1969 annual series. The
structural price equation which best compares with earlier works gives103
the following results:
P = 85.37 - .00_3 Y Z R2 = .94
(-7.71) (18.22) DW = 1.99
wheme Y is real GNP and Z is money supply.
Instead of regressing absolute prices on absolute levels of
money supply, Clunies-Ross used first differences. He showed that for
1955 to 1965 data, the relation was not significant with R2 only
.06. He cautioned against interpreting high correlation in the serially
correlated variables. This gave him reason to stress the structural
causes of the 1962-64 inflation. All studies had both supply of money
and goods as the explanatomy variables of price, Treadgold fitted his
function to annual data fop the period 1946-65, using real GNP as his
supply variable. He found that the variance of these variables accounted
fop much of the variance in prices. He also observed that velocity of
money_ V, was not constant duming this period. Though he noted this,
no adjustments for changing V was made. Encamnaci6n and Tan's works also
failed to consider changes in velocity. According to Hooley (1965) V
rose mope than twice between 1948 and 1963. Most of the increase
occurred in the 1960s, Hooley argued that t_ght money situation and
high interest rates caused the increase in the value of V. Such rise
tends to offset the impact of restrictive monetary policy. Over Time V104
mose from about 4 in the S0s to about 8 in the 70s. This may be partly
explained by the growth of the financial system.
In the light of other resu_ts_ it seems that such simple
specifications of the long-run functions as in Treadgodd, Encarnaci6n
et. al., and T_n give at best a rough relationship of money supply and
prices. The coefficients cannot be interpreted, however, as a good
measure of the monetary impact on prices. Further_nore, domestic supply
of consumption of goods rather than GNP should be used. The effect of
t:he external sectoP likewise has To be considered. Some of these
failings are o_ercome in a subsequent •paper by Otani. Otani (19"75)
developed a short-run flow model which explains price adjustment toward
a long-Pun equilibrium. Short-_un equilibrium can be viewed as a
temporary state which The system must pass through in the process of
achieving a long-run equilibrium. In effect such a short-run equilibrium
may well he a disequ_l_brium state in terms of the long-run equilibrium
position. Both the flow and stock demand are equal to the supplies in
The latter.
There are three equations describing the adjustment processes
from short-run flow equilibrium towards the long-run equilibrium. These
consisted of a real cash balance stock adjustment, price adjustment
and impmmt equations. These are as follows:
i, '105
M_ I) h log ( )t = -4.77 ￿1.21 loE Y - 0.29 pe . 0.83 log (_)t-i (4.01) t (-2.73) t (-3.94)
R2 = .34 D.W. = 1.05
2) h log Pdt = -0.004 + 0.21 (log Y - log _) ￿0.32 pe ￿0.62
(1.00) t (6.69) t (6.25)
= 0.77 D.W. = 1.97
Pd
= _Z - 0.68 log Z
3) A log Zt -_.27 + 0.99 log Y + 0.61 log ( )t t-1
(3.5_) t (.78) t3.69)
R2 = 0.42 D.W. = 1.54
Notationally,
M_ = average stock of nominal money;
P = the general price level_
Y : level of real income;
pe = expected rate of inflation; t
• - d . M*) _- A log [_ )t = d L log (_)t " log [_ Z-I /
d = adjustment coefficient lying between zero and unity
in the equation.
Y = the "normal" level of output, which is increasing at
constant mate;
Z = volume of impo_ts;
Pd = _he price of domestically pmoduced and cons_ed goods;• 106
P = the domestic price of exports; x
P : the domestic price of imports; z
The estimated equations trace quite well the major swings
in the Peal cash balances, domestic prices and inputs. To see how
well the model as a whole traces actual movements in the economy, a
simulation exercise was carried out by making use of the reduced form
of the structural equations.
Unlike other results in earlier papers, the immediate
impact of credit expansion on prices is found to be rather small, a
&O% increase in domestic credit lead to a 0.5 per cent rise in the
general prices level and a 0.7 per cent increase in the prices of
domestic goods. The author argued this weak impact reflects rigidity
in the economy or a high price elasticity of short-run supply of goods,
The elasticity was estimated at about 5 (the reciprocal of the estimated
coefficient b3 of equation (2) above. In the short-run purely external
factors explained most of the upward pressure on prices while credit
expansion exerted a relatively weak effect on the same. The impact of
m_ey supply on inflation is felt more in the longer run. It is to be
noted that its impact on growth of output is found to be nil. Solving
for the longer-Pun impact multipliers, Otani obtained the following:107
Table 19
PHILIPPINES: FACTORS AFFECTING INFLATION
(In per cent)
P rcent ge change inobserved rate
of inflation due to;
Unexplained
Observed Lagged changes in
_ate of., Extemnal^. endogenous Domestic observed
inflation _/ factoPs _/ variables_/ factors_ / inflation
1960 4,8 •72.9 -129.2 -20,8 •177.1
1961 4.7 59.6 55.3 23,4 -38.3
1962 2.0 255.0 130.0 -10.0 -275.0
1963 8.4 50.0 -29.8 8.3 71.4
1964 6.8 11.8 110.3 .... 22.1
1965 2.5 40.0 180.0 -24.0 -96o0
1966 5.7 21.1 28.1 -1.8 52.6-
1967 2.3 -- 278.3 17,4 -195.7
1968 1.4 -42.9 157.1 -21.4 7.1
1969 1.7 94.1 117.6 -- -111.8
1970 21.8 81.7 -- -1,5 19.8
1971 18.2 42.5 68.3 -1.8 -9.0
1972 12.4 33.6 64.7 -- 1.7
1973 18.1 84.3 40.4 -- -24.7
1974 52.1
1975 9.4
Source: Ichiro Otani, "Inflation in an Open Economy--A Case Study of
the Philippines_" IMY, Staff Papers, Vol. XXII, No. 3
(November 1975).
/
I__/ In terms of wholesale price index of domestically produced and
consumed goods.
2/ External factors are expor_ and import prices and volume of exports.
_/ The pressure on prices of the economy slowly adjusting tO changes
duping previous periods.
4/ Domestic factors: tmend value of real GDP and domestic cmedit of
the banking system.I08
The papers bring us a long way to understanding causes of
post-war inflation in the Philippines and to some extent the process of
inflation. Otani's paper reconciles in a way the seemingly conflicting
conclusions about the impact of monetary expansion on pmices made by
Clunies-Ross, Bautista, Encarnaci6n and Tan. The conflict arises
because short-run adjustment to changes in exogenous variables and their
long-run impact were not distinguished. Both in the long-Pun and the
short-run, external factors such as changes in export and import
prices were found to exert the strongest effect on domestic prices. In
contmast_ the effect of money supply was felt in _he longer-run mainly,
and only weakly in the short-run. It is to be noted that it has no
long-run impact on output. An equally import conclusion from the studies
is the very heavy inflationary pressure exerted by domestic foodsupply, espe-
cially in high inflation periods. It seems that the pressure of domestic food
supply has been increasing in this decade. FUture works On inflation should,
therefore, not neglect the supply side. There is danger tha_ future
researches may focus exclusively on the mope obvious causes,
particularly the oii crisis.
8. Savings in the Philippines and in the Rural Sector
The literature on savings in the Philippines spans only a
little over a decade. It evolves from works aimed at estimation to
testing of savings function. The most recent works include an
investigation of saving behaviour and portfolio choice in the agricultural109
sector. This review traces the historical progress of the literature.
The section is divided into two -- a) estimation of savings aimed at
providing an independent estimate That would corroborate the figures
given in national income accounts; and b) savings functions including
rural savings.
a. Estimation of Savings Rate
Early calculations of national income accounts did not
independently estimate consumption. GNP was obtained from value
added of various sectors. Data on sectoral incomes came from different
sources. Among them were the Securities and Exchange Commission, Bureau
of Agricultural Economics and The Government Auditing Office. Independent
estimates of investment, depreciation, taxes and Sovernment expenditures
were made. Consumption was taken as a residual of GNP. The method
was used until 1965 hence, no independent estimate of consumption and
savings was made. It Turned out that during these years estimated
personal saving was negative. Since consumption was calculated asa
residual, any error in any of the expenditure components or in the Total
is absorbed by the residual. Hooley (1963) contended that investment
was understated leading to the overstatement of consumption. In an
attempt to correct this possible error, Hoo!ey undertook a major
estimation work leading to his 1963 monograph, Savings in the Philippines:
1951-1960.110
Hooley estimated saving as equal to the change in net worth
for households, corporations and government. In this case saving includes
capital gains or losses. Net worth consists of physical and f_nancial
assets net of liabilities. Corporate and government savings were
obtained from their balance sheet statement. These needed adjustments
to get a uniform industry classification and comparable accounting
especially of depreciation. For households, data on their financial
assets were mainly reconstructed from Central Bank reports taking into
account holdings. Physical assets Were obtained from the same source for
construction and consumer durables in the national income account. These
in principle was the method of estimation used. Fo_ each g_oup of
spending units separate data sources were used. Careful and tedious work
was involved in getting the estimates.
The saving rate obtained differed significantly from that of
the national accounts using residual method. It was positive and
reasonably high. Moreover_Hooley found that the saving rate accelerated
from 11 per cent in i@58 to 17 per cent in 1962 and households contri-
buted almost two-thirds to total savings. In the same study9 he also
tried the income approach using the '_disappearance" method. The
results and that from the National Income Accounts are presented below.
Following Ho01ey's work the NEDA had the national accounts

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data base was tremendously improved since the 50s and early 50s so
the new series gives a more reliable set of accounts. P?e-1965 estimates
were revised to give a comparative series for all post-war years.
Hooley, in collaboration with Moreno, pursued this work
in a very important study of flow of funds for 1950-1962. The flow of
funds for each spending sector -- households, government and corpora-
tions was studied. The flow of receipts and disbursements into current
and capital expenses was also traced. The estimated flows provide a
number of interesting information: saving and the portfolio chosen
classified according to financial and physical categories and the out-
lay for the different production factors like payroll, intermediate
goods, taxes, interest and depreciation. These were obtained from a
survey asking for both statements of operation and balance sheet.
Saving was estimated as the change in net worth. The trend of saving
and portfolio holdings particularly of financial assets was analyzed.
They were also able to give The industrial structume of manufacturing
and banking sectors. Among their major findings are as follows:
a) The manufacturing sector had a high concentration ratio,
two (2) pep cent of firms owned 60 per cent of assets and i0 per cent
controlled 90 per cent of assets.
b) Financial claims grew rapidly in absolute terms, and in
r .
relations to GNP i.e., from _500 million to _3.5 billion from 1949 to113
1962, and from 10 to 30 per cent of GNP over the same period. This
rapid growth implied an increasing proportion of investment being
financed through financial institutions. The increase in financial
assets _eflected increased holding of currency_ demand and other
deposits.
c) The upward trend in household saving rate observed in
Hooley's earlier study continued: it rose from 11 per cent in 1958 to
17 per cent in 1962. The government on the other hand, was found to be
a very low saver. Its saving rate declined from 13 per cent in 1958
to 9 per cent in 1962. Its contribution to saving was then minimal
%
during this period since its revenue accounted to less than i0 per cent
of GNP. Corporate saving rate, especially of financial institutions,
was also high -- 64 per cent in 1958 and 69 per cent in 1962.
d) Though financial assets were rapidly growing they
found that commercial banks relied on plowed-in profits for almost one-
third of their loanable funds. This ratio was extremely high compared
with other countries. Accordingly, this reflected the failure of
commercial banks to channel more savings into the banking system. More-
over, most of the financial growth originated from commercial banks,
It was also found that the payroll's share in the expense
flows for corporation was low compared with other economies. Besides,114
_t declined from about 25 per cent in 1957 between i0 and 12 per cent
in 1962. Prior to 1957, it was about 20 per Cent. For the household
sector_ wages and salaries constituted less than half of total income
most of them from ent_epreneurships.
Finally, the possible impact of financial intermediation on
capital expenditures was estimated arguing that availability of credit
tended to encourage capital expenditures. They found that both income
and financial variables exerted a significant influence in explaining
investment in fixed capital. Changes in inventory was apparently the
only capital component that responded to income for both corpomate and
household sector.
More recent data on the flow of funds were generated. Moreno
and Vasquez (1977) extended the corporate flow of savings to 1975.
Supertiehoso (1979) reported on the 1974-76 flow of saving for each of
the three sectors - households, government and corporate - produced
by NCSO. The 1974 NCBO flow of funds data were studied by the IMF-
CBP survey team in 1977. Lastly_ TBAC-BRF (Technical Board for Agri-
cultural Credit and the Business Research Foundation) used flow of
saving data in their work on the saving of farm families. So far a
rather brief analysis in the form of reports was done on the NCSO data.
None was done by Moreno and Vasquez. The IMF-CBP 1977 Report devoted
only a page of analysis of the 1974 NCSO data. Despite this shortcoming,115
the new set of data built important links to the 1958-62 findings. It
provides future researches with a very rich data base for work on saving
and portfolio choice and related areas.
Saving rate stabilized at the 1962 level. For 1974-76_
Supe_tichoso estimated saving rate to be between 15 and 18 per cent
(compared to the Hooley-Moreno rate of 17 per cent for 1962). The share
of households went down however_ tO the 45 and 51 per cent range. In
1974-1975, government saving _ate doubled the 1958-62 rate but it
dropped back to the previous level in 1976. The relative share of cor-
porate saving went up so also with the non-bank financial institutions
relative to the total financial share. This rise coincided with the ac-
tive transactions in the money market dumlnZ the early part of the 70s.
Supertichoso reported that net income of non-bank institutions rose
from _20 million in 1975 to _660 million in 1976. In 1974, net income
was only BII2 million. These wide fluctuations might have, been _ue to
the wide movement of interes_ rates in which these institutions were
engaged in.
The financial sytem as a whole received larze inflows of
external funds, _2.2 Billion in 1974, _6.2 Billion in 1975_ and _5.8
Billion in 1976. Supertichoso argued that this large inflow had a
positive effect in the purchases of government securities by financial
institutions. We may argue off-hand that the decision to buy government116
securities was only partly determined by supply of funds. Relative
yield on alternative assets has To be considered in any demand for assets.
Households_ on the other hand, moved away from Securities to physical
assets. Their security holdings then dropped from _6 million in 1974 to
_1.8 million in 1976.
Supertichoso's conclusions on the flow of savings were based
on a not so careful and detailed analysis o£ the flows between sectors
- spending as well as financial. Despite this weakness, the NCSO made
an invaluable contribution to produce this rich set of data. They are
a challenge to future researchers.
Turning now to the farm sector TBAC-BRF looked into the
distributional aspects of saving. Reproduced below is their table
giving the distribution of asset and saving rate by income classes.
Surprisingly_ land and its improvements did not constitute a large
proportion of total assets. Livestock and equipment predominated
while financial assets were relatively small. Dissaving of farm
families occur I for income groups below FI,500 per year. This differs
from the dissaving among much higher income groups for the who!ePhilippines.
While rural families borrow to increase their assets, it is not certain
that they got funds from rural banks. Rural banks had low and
declining loan/deposit ratio. The authors interpreted this tO mean






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































possibly the urban sector. Encarnaci6n (1964) made the same observation
earlier.
A lot more work can be done on savin_ and portfolio choice.
The papers on flow of funds provided us with important'insights into
this joint decision of household and business but some questions have
been left for future work. We know very little of the saving and
portfolio behavior of low income families, of families with uncertain
agricultural income; whether and how these families differ in this
behavior from their urban counterpart. There is moreover, no clear
evidence as to the effect of interest rate and intermediation on the said
behavior. We analyzed earlier the positive implications of having an
unhampered intermediation. From this we see the importance of studying
saving and portfolio decisons as _ joint decision. The data should be
able to provide empirical support to models of financial market
segmentation. What determines reliance on self-finance? Are self-
financed firms generally the small and/or the less profitable?
The other studies on saving are not directly relevant
to the field of monetary economics. For this reason they are merely
included in the bibliodraphy for use by future researchers..119
Concluding Remarks
The financial market grew very rapidly f_om a very small and
unvaried base when the Philippines established a managed currency system
in 1948. It took on a pattern of development which showed evidence of
artificial segmentation. Segmentation resulted from the way financial
institutions responded to policy and as a direct consequence of regula-
tions. The growth of the money market for instance was a response to
the _egulation of interest rates on bank loans and deposits. In 1_76,
money market rates and denomlnat_ons were also regulated as a response
of the Central Bank to the rapid growth of transactions and high yield
offered_ There is informal evidence the regulation resulted in furthe_
seoomnentation in this market. A two-tiered interest rate is currently
observed. Very large placements tend to be paid hi_her rates than
smaller ones. These deposits get around the regulation on minimal
placement of B200,000 by their artificial pooling into trust funds. The 35
per cent tax on money market liability is gotten around by direct borrowing120
and lending arranged by the intermediary bank. l_ile this segment of
the market has been growing rapidly, intermediation among small
depositors and borrowers has slackened.
A number of papers evaluated such policies, especially those
regulating interest rates,,money market denominations, discounting and
marketing of government securities. These papers were mainly expository
innature though some empirical support for the arguments have been given.
In our view they form an adequate set of work that provides a strong
basis for changing policy toward deregulation and f_eeing of the
market. There is strong argument for deregulation of interest rates
and discontinuance of the large credit incentives given to inefficient
financial institutions such as some government-supported banks and to
!
the highly successful large commercial, banks. The removal of the
infant industry protection given to _ura! and development banks is
/l<ely to make them more competitive in attracting funds and more
efficient in lending them. Deregulation of interest rat_s and granting
of generous discounting privileges to private coramercial banks would
have similar results. It will also tend to prevent price discrimination
among borrowers and lenders as is p_aetieed now.
In spite of the strong arguments brought out against the
present system of extensive control, there seems to be no consensus about
the issue of freeing the market, The monetary authority has increasingly121
become oriented toward control as shown by the r'apid gmowth of regula-
tions from the relatively free market regime of the 50s. It is to the
banking system's interest to preserve the status _uo. In this wa_ they
can continue to obtain subsidized funds from private as well as
inflationary sources. The segment of the financial system that does not
obtain subsidy_ say the bond and equity market or the small thrift
institutions, are too small a zroup to be able to _nitiate changes. It
is probably for these reasons that the system of control has been
retained and expanded. At the same time it might be argued that the
monetary authority has a segmented view of financial inte_nediation.
It imposes regulations on each _ , part of the market one at a time
without considering that financial claims, whether viewed as assets or
as liabilities by the transactors, are substitutes. As substitutes_
regulations affecting the supply or _the yield of one instrument
affect the rest.
Given this institutional climate and orientation
recent foreign missions that have been invited to review policy seemed
to have joined the band-wagon of Philippine central and private bankers.
We _refer in particular to the 1972 and 1977 IHF-CBP survey teams and
the 1976 World Bank Country Report. The 1972 IMF-CDP team came out
with very significant policy recommendations man_ of wh&ch were
immediately enacted into l_e. Their repomt contains a total Of 99 (_)
recommendations for policy changes. A short rationale is given foreach recommendation. Here _e will focus on what we consider to be the
more important recommended changes, namely:
1. Expand the[coverage of CB re_Tulations to, all financial
intermediaries While at the same time applying uniform
regulations to each set of similar instruments, whether or
not they are issued by banks or non-bank intermediaries. This
allows the CB to apply to all financial intermediaries and
instruments reserve requirements and interest rate ceiling.
2. The Usury Law was repealed giving the monetary
authority the power to set the interest rate ceiling on all
claims.
3. Ownership of banks is encouraged to be diffused.
At the same time branch_ instead of unit banking, is
encouraged. A supplementary regulation to achieve th_s
objective is the requirement to increase banking equity.
Diffusion of ownership is to be accomplished by prohibiting
relatives up to f ird degree of consanguinity to own more than
20 per cent of a bank equity. Preemptive rights over DBP
contribution to rural han)_ capital is not to be given to
_'affluent_'owne_,s of said banks.
Other recommendations such as greater independence for CB
from the executive branch of the government, ne_ limit to government
borrowing from CB, and new debt-equity ratios are deemed of less
significance to efficiency of intermediation.
Moreover_ the survey team recommended that because of the
success of the money market in drawing funds, it should give incentives
to lon_r-t_rm competing instruments. Thus the CB came up with a new
schedule of time deposit rates starting from 7.5 per centfor 60-day time
deposits to no cefling for mo_e than two-year maturity. It is difficult to123
expect the long-term market can be developed by regulations, and of the
type used here.
The repeal of the Usury Law was a very important achieve-
ment, It should allow for a note rational policy on interest rate.
The recent interest _egulations were however anything but a move toward a
relaxation of the structu3_e of rates. The average nominal rates were
raised rather substantially. The structure of rates became more
rigid as it was tied to the maturity of the instrument. Moreover, the
margi n between deposit and loan rates remained wide. There is the
question whether the i/2 percentage rate differential ziven for 60-
day maturity differential adequately compensates fop the illiquldity and
risk in this lengthening of the asset. The circulars stipulating these
rates did not give a rationale for the mates chosen.
We cannot disagree with the recommendation of the survey team
fop the CB to treat money market instruments of similar nature and maturity
or riskiness uniformly. In the same vein it is not clear why a money
market Jnstrument_ say a post-dated check or a deposit substitute should
be treated differently from a regular deposit. It seems inconsistent
zhat special recommendations on money market is made together with this on
uniform treatment.
The literature is unsettled about the need to regulate all
financial institutions. The debate originated with Gurley and Shaw in
which they argue that non-bank financial intermediaries are also able124
to increase the level of credit beyond their deposit liabilities. For
this reason they should be regulated like commercial banks. OTher
economists respond to this by pointingto the strong substitutability of
financial instruments. Policy affecting one form of financial assets
would have repercussions on others. Thus it is sufficient to limit
control to the principal segment of the market, i.e., commercial banks.
It is felt that this debate is not very important to us_ The significance
of the recommendation of the IMF is that it encourages the Central
Bank to expand its already widespread system of control. In fact the
additional regulations that ensued as a consequence of this recommendation
added additional complexity to intermediation and possibly to more
artificial segmentation.
The third recommendation which may h_ve very serious
implications especially in the long-run is that on merger. It is well
known that the financial market includes horizontally integmated
commercial banks and investment houses. Merger would encourage for_nation
of oligOpolies. A substantial number of banks merged in the last two or
three years. The pattern of merging is for a large foreign bank or
a large domestic bank to merge with smaller ones_ We are thus
J /
following a policy opposite that of anti-trust in other countries (U.S.,
India). Financial oligopolies will not have as serious implications
under a relatively free market system. In the case where the government125
grants substantial/credit subsidy and have extensive other regulations,
the imperfections in the market are likely to be seriously exacerbated.
The full implications of this policy is not analyzed here but it can be
expected that it will have serious negative impact on the efficiency of
intermediation and equity.
A related policy that is currently contemplated is universal
banking. This has to be placed in the context of the upward trend of oligopoly
formation and system of regulations. It is not likely that universal
banking will favor the smaller than the bigger banks. If the latter
expand faster as a consequence, the t_end toward oligopoly will hasten.
Turning back to the literature, the more recent papers
included empirical works - a few on money supply function and inflation
and several on saving. The results sometimss supported_ but sometimes
contradicted each other. This was true for the money supply and
inflation hypotheses tested. More rigor seems needed in model building
paying parZicular _ttention to correct specifications of the hypotheses
taking account of the institutional setting. Future econometric work
should attempt at obtaining a more accurate measure of interest rates.
Models of money supply have to consider the conduct of quantitative as
well as selective monetary control tools to be able to identify relevant
explanatory v_riables and specify the model co?rectly. Appmopriate
lags in the relationship has not been worked out in past works. There126
is need to correct for this. It is also hoped that larger models will
be built in the future.
There is no literature addressed directly to the stmueture of
interest rate. The information provided came from rather disparate
sources. These were papers dealing with different topics such as the
World Bank Country Report studies on credit to farmers, money market
activities, etc. The rates differed very widely and no matu_i_:y pat%_x_
is discernible. The real rates on popular savings forms were oftentimes
negative and those determined more freely in the market _ere very much
higher° These data give us neither complete rate structure nor an
adequate time series. This topic begs maiy researchable questions.
Basic among these is providing estimates of the interest rate structure.
Except for Clemente_s and the NEC data_ the information on rates reported
here was from secondary sources. It is to be noted that some of the data
were not even consistent with each other. Clemente_s money market rates
differed from those reported by the World Bank.
A second basic question is how the regulated and unregulated
/
rates interact with each other. There were a few attempts to develop
demand for asset functions. These still lack rigor. The empirical
results are not conclusive. But we cannot have conclusive results unless
reliable information on interest rate is available. It will be important
to find the interest elasticity of portfolio demand by savers of127
different characteristics. Flow of funds data will be useful for this
study. We have_ howeverg mostly sporadic series_ such as the Hooley-Moreno
-_/962-65 and the NCSO 197_-76 statistics. It may be suggested that the
recent NCSO work become a continuing regular annual effort at obtaining
flow of funds.
A distribution study similar to that done by TBAC-BRF on its
flow of saving using existing data may be feasible. It should show the
movement of funds f_om rural to urban areas and should also give light
to the saving-portfolio decisions of rural and urban households and
firms.
No work has been done on Credit allocation and the finance
cost borne by different types of borrowers in the financial market.
Such work should be integrated with the cost of finance and means
of financing of spending units that have no access to the institutionalized
market. These studies would help us understand the extent of segmenta-
tion and its implications on efficiency and equity. There is the related
question Of the relative cost of financing through equity and bond issUe_
Are the transaction costs of borrowing through these issues higher rhan
through financing intermediary loans?
There has been no work on portfolio behavior of financial
intermediaries. Reserve and other portfolio selection may be researched128
by itself or as part of a money supply model. It should explain in a
rigOrOUS fashion observed composition of assets and liabilities of
banks and non-bank institutions.
Professor Patrick of Yale University, a recent visitor to
Manila is intrigued by the extreme dynamism of the financial sector.
He notes very rapid growth of the market as a whole but especially of
certain segments. There is the money market of course. Notable is the
apparent success of a few large banks. He also notes the merging of a
munber of them and thephenomenal growth of a few merged institutions
such as PIS0, A related observation is the apparent vertical integra-
tion of some of large finance-industrial conglomerates. The question
arises as to what the allocative impact may be of conglomerate banking
in the Philippine con%ext. The answer will differ depending on the
degree of imperfections in both goods and credit market. Under perfect
conditions it may give rite to greater efficiency; under imperfect
conditions it will tend to result in greater_nefficiency.
This review came to focus on policy issues facing the
Philippine financial system, "This f0eus was inevitable a many o{_he
papers were addressed to policy with a numb_ being critical of the co_d_d_ of
of moneta_ affairs by the Central Bank. It is hoped that research in the
future will take on the natume of positiveeconomlcs. We are aware that our
conclusions sound prescriptive. We apologize we _me not able to changethem.129
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